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LOTTING LARGE: THE PHENOMENON OF
MINIMUM LOT SIZE LAWS
Paul Boudreaux*
ABSTRACT
A dominant feature of American metropolitan areas is large lot zoning—the
policy through which only house lots of a minimum size are permitted. This
practice of “lotting large” contributes greatly to the sprawling nature of American
suburbs. By restraining the supply of housing, large lot zoning laws please
existing suburban homeowners. But they harm all other segments of the American
populace, including the million new households who seek a home in the United
States each year. This article explains how courts have been unwilling or unable
to impose any meaningful restraints on local governments. It develops a simple
economic model that shows that the constitutional law of regulatory takings
provides an impetus for localities to choose large lot zoning over other methods of
controlling housing density. Using these lessons, the article charts a path toward
reform, through which local governments are encouraged to curtail their reliance
on the outmoded practice of lotting large.

I. INTRODUCTION
Which legal policy has the greatest impact on how we physically construct our
communities? The answer may well be the land use policy that requires that house
lots be a certain minimum size: large lot zoning. The practice of “lotting large” is
responsible, to an extent, for the creation of the typical sprawling American suburb,
an auto-dependent culture, and housing prices beyond the reach of many moderateincome households. Remarkably, however, the phenomenon of large lot zoning, to
which courts have almost uniformly deferred, has received little scrutiny in the
legal literature.
This article seeks to correct the omission and offer a path for reform. It sets
forth a simple economic model by which the widespread popularity of large lot
zoning is explained by a community’s desires to restrain population density, in a
manner that is defensible under the constitutional law of regulatory takings. The
United States, which in the twenty-first century adds a million new households
each year, can no longer afford to bow to the parochial wishes of existing
homeowners for large lot zoning. The practice both restrains the free market from
building new housing and raises the costs of all categories of homes. The only
effective legal solution is for state governments to restrain local governments from
lotting large, while still protecting them from property rights challenges.
This article proceeds in the following manner. Part II exposes the widespread
phenomenon of large lot zoning, and endeavors to explain why such constraints are
inefficient and deleterious policy choices. Part III discusses the deferential judicial
* Professor, Stetson University College of Law, Gulfport and Tampa, Florida. This article was
supported by a research grant from Stetson Law. The author thanks student research assistant Sarah
Gottlieb for her valuable contributions. The author also thanks Professor David Schoenbrod for his
groundbreaking research on this topic.
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review of lotting large, while Part IV sets forth a simple economic model of local
preferences for large lot zoning. Part V charts a path toward legal reform, through
which state law might compel local governments to eschew large lot zoning in
certain areas, while moderating local political objections.
II. THE PHENOMENON: MANDATING LARGE LOTS FOR SHRINKING
AMERICAN HOUSEHOLDS
Large lot zoning laws are a ubiquitous phenomenon of the American suburban
scene. This is an ironic development, considering the nation’s changing
demographics and social geography, in which the average household size is
shrinking and the amenities desired by the large families in the 20th century now
longer hold sway.
A. American Exceptionalism
American metropolitan areas are constructed differently from those in other
nations. American suburbs are more sprawling—meaning fewer houses in a given
area. Even compared to the affluent nations of Western Europe, in which
automobiles are as popular as they are in the United States, American suburbs are
less densely populated.1 American suburbs typically contain large suburban lots,
especially those that are miles from the central city. As a result, American
metropolitan areas are less dense than those in other wealthy nations.2 Measured
by “footprint”—that is, the extent in square miles—eight of the nine largest urban
areas in the world are in the United States.3 The distinction is so stark that the
world’s metropolitan areas might be divided into two almost distinct categories:

1. The prevalence of large-lot zoning, which requires that population be spread out, discourages
use of public transportation, which in turn leads to its lower availability, thus creating a vicious circle.
Among affluent nations, the number of motor vehicles per person range from 500 to 800 vehicles per
1000 persons. See World Bank, Motor Vehicles (Per 1,000 people) (2010),
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IS.VEH.NVEH.P3.
2. The average density of U.S. urban areas is approximately 3,100 persons per square mile, by far
the smallest in the world. In comparison, the European Union nations as a whole is approximated at
7,300 persons per square mile. The data are drawn from Demographia, Demographia World Urban
Areas 133 (11th ed. 2014), http://www.demographia.com /db-worldua.pdf. This report attempted to
calculate both population and urban size of “continuously built up land mass of urban development.”
This assessment yields smaller areas than other calculations of metropolitan areas, which often are
determined by political boundaries. Id. at 2. The densities for big urban areas (with more than 2 million
persons) range in the United States from a high of about 6,300 persons per square mile in the Los
Angeles area (which is dense because of its large population and geographic constraints) to only 2,200
for Boston (which has sprawling suburbs, despite its dense central city) to 1,800 in notoriously
sprawling Atlanta. By contrast, the large European urban areas are significantly denser, such as London
(15,100 per persons per square mile), Paris (10,000), and Milan (7,200). The world’s densest urban
areas are in developing nations, with the highest density being Dhaka, Bangladesh, with 114,000
persons per square mile. The world’s least dense urban area is Knoxville, Tenn., with only 1,300
persons per square mile. Id. at 16-17.
3. Id. at 94. The non-American exception is Tokyo, which is by far the most populous urban area
in the world. Id. The United States holds only three of the world’s fifty most populous areas: New
York, Los Angeles, and Chicago. Id. at 16-17.
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sprawling American metros and more compact metros in other nations.4
A number of factors contribute to this American exceptionalism. First, the
United States has been, and remains, one of the wealthiest nations in the world.5
Wealth tends to correlate with owning a home, with a larger home lot, and an
automobile, all of which encourage a suburbanized, spread-out metro population.6
Second, American social policy has long been to foster homeownership, through
steps such as the mortgage interest tax deduction7 and government-sponsored
corporations such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which stimulate home lending.8
Third, the United States has spent lavishly on roads and suburban infrastructure,
which allows metropolitan development to expand.9 Fourth, the United States
recognizes a constitutional right of a landowner to use his or her land profitably,
thus leading to suburban construction even in locations far from the central city.10
Fifth and relatedly, the United States tends to eschew rules, such as Britain’s
“greenbelts,” that legally restrain development within metropolitan borders.11
But large lot zoning laws also contribute to the sprawling American suburban
4. Of the 922 metro areas in the world with more than 500,000 people, the great majority of the
least-dense metro areas are in the United States. Id. at 16-17.
5. According to one prominent study, throughout the 20th century the United States had the
highest gross domestic product per capita of any large country in the world. See Growth of World
Population, GDP and GDP Per Capita before 1820, app. B tbl. B-21 (1998),
http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/other_books/appendix_B.pdf.
6. See generally, A Suburban World, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 6, 2014, available at
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21635486-emerging-world-becoming-suburban-its-leadersshould-welcome-avoid-wests (discussing the role of wealth in encouraging suburban development).
7. 16 U.S.C. § 163(h)(3) (2012); see also Roberta F. Mann, The (Not So) Little House on the
Prairie: The Hidden Costs of the Mortgage Interest Deduction, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1347 (2000)
(discussing the adverse incentives created by the deduction).
8. John Griffith, 7 Things You Need to Know About Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, CENTER FOR
AMERICAN PROGRESS (Sept. 6, 2012), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/
2012/09/GriffithFannieFreddieBrief.pdf (assessing a variety of policy issues associated with the
mortgage agencies).
9. Joseph Henchman, Gasoline Taxes and User Fees Pay for Only Half of State & Local Road
Spending, THE TAX FOUNDATION (2014), http://taxfoundation.org/article/gasoline-taxes-and-user-feespay-only-half-state-local-road-spending (survey concluding that about half of road spending comes from
user fees and another half from government expenditures).
10. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (the right against uncompensated “taking” of private property);
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1007-09 (1992) (government must compensate a
landowner when a regulation has removed “all economically beneficial uses" of land); see also
discussion at Part IV, infra.
11. These restraints, around cities such as London, Oxford, and Cambridge, make it difficult to
build suburban developments. Rowan Moore, Is It Time to Rethink Britain's Green Belt?, THE
GUARDIAN, Oct. 19, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/oct/19/is-it-time-to-rethink-thegreen-belt. They are a major reason that British housing is among the most expensive in the world. Paul
Cheshire, Why House Prices Are So Expensive in the UK, THE GUARDIAN, May 12, 2014,
http://www.theguardian.com/housing-network/2014/may/12/why-house-prices-so-expensive-uk.
The only American city that follows a similar path is Portland, Oregon, whose three-county “urban
growth boundary” has been assessed with mixed conclusions. For a favorable view, see Wayne
(August
12,
2013),
Senville,
Urban
Growth
Boundaries,
PLANNERSWEB
http://plannersweb.com/2013/08/urban-growth-boundaries. For a critical view, asserting that the
greenbelt simply pushes development to distant suburbs outside the control of the Portland Metro
authority, see Portland: Urban Growth Boundary Keeps Out Growth, DEMOGRAPHIA,
http://www.demographia.com/db-porugbmigr.pdf (last visited Sept. 2, 2015).
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landscape. By requiring that house lots be a minimum size, these laws necessarily
restrain the number of housing units (houses, apartments, or mobile homes) in a
given area. 12 Consider an area of 100 acres. With small house lots of a quarteracre each, this area might hold up to 400 houses. With apartment buildings, the
number could be even higher. But with a large-lot zoning law that commands that
lots be a minimum of two acres, the 100 acres may hold, by law, no more than 50
housing units.
Research has failed to reveal any national survey of the total extent of large-lot
zoning acreage in the United States. This lack of information is due, in large part,
to the fact that zoning in the United States remains a decidedly local matter.13 But
an area-by-area study undertaken for this article shows an unvarying pattern. From
big metro areas, such as New York and Los Angeles, to small ones, such as
Knoxville and Boise, large lot zoning laws restrain density—especially in large
stretches of affluent suburban counties.
The table below seeks to show the ubiquity of lotting large. It includes
examples of large-lot zoning in the 15 largest metro areas in the nation. In each
instance, the example chosen was in a “popular” suburban region—that is, an
affluent area in which demand for housing is relatively strong and housing prices
relatively high.14 Each suburban area revealed the practice of large lot zoning.15

12. A law that imposes a minimum size of X acres per lot over a space of A acres restricts the
number of housing units to A/X. Without such a law, there is no limit on the number of housing units
within A.
13. Zoning laws in the United States are nearly almost always created by local governments. See
JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT
REGULATION LAW 16-27, 43-53 (2d. ed. 2007) (discussing the development of zoning as a matter of
local government regulation). Neither the federal nor state governments compile data concerning types
of zoning. The local control of zoning is one reason that many scholars and commentators tend to
ignore it – “merely” local laws might not seem as significant as federal or state laws. Nor are local
governments required to publish their laws, codes, and ordinances in any uniform method or format,
which complicates a national survey. Moreover, for large counties with large populations, publication
of a zoning map is difficult to render in anything other than a large chart, because of the existence of
hundreds of separates zones. Online, one must search for a specific location in order to ascertain the
applicable zoning.
14. The jurisdictions were chosen by the author through personal knowledge of the various
American metropolitan areas.
15. This even includes the Houston metro area, which is famously unique for the fact that both the
central city and the surrounding Harris County do not hold traditional zoning laws. See John Mixon,
Four Land Use Vignettes From Unzoned Houston, 24 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 159
(2010) (discussing how land use works in Houston, without a comprehensive zoning law). But
neighboring Fort Bend County, which is rapidly growing and includes many of the region’s most
affluent suburbs, does allow zoning; the chart gives data for the wealthy suburb of Sugar Land, which
imposes extensive large-lot zoning. See sources in table 1.
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Table 1. Examples of Large Lot Zoning in Suburbs in the Nation's 15 Largest
Metro Areas.
Metro Area
Zoning
Large Lot Zoning
Jurisdiction
Example
New York

Town of Cortlandt,
N.Y.

R-80: 80,000 sq. ft.
minimum16

Los Angeles

Orange County,
Cal.

E1 “Estates” District: 1
acre minimum17

Chicago

Du Page County,
Ill.

R-1: 100,000 sq. ft.
minimum18

Denton, Tex.

RC: 2 acre minimum19

Sugar Land, Tex.

R-1E: 1.5 acre
minimum20

Washington, D.C.

Fairfax County,
Va.

3-P00 R-P: 10 acre
minimum21

Boston

Norfolk Town,
Mass.

R-3: 55,000 sq. ft.
minimum22

San Francisco

Marin County,
Cal.

R-1: 7,500 sq. ft.
minimum23

Dallas
Houston

16. CORTLANDT, N.Y., ZONING REGS. §§ 307-17 (2015), http://ecode360.com/
attachment/CO0244/CO0244-307c%20Table%20of%20Dimensional%20Regs.pdf
(map: http://www.townofcortlandt.com/documents/zoning%20map/zoning041808-100.pdf).
17. ORANGE CNTY., CA., ZONING CODE § 7-9-65.8 (2005), http://www.lardnerklein.com/
jthg_report/jthg_sign%20ordinances/OrangeSec.%207-9-144.2_Permitted_signs.pdf.
18. DU PAGE CNTY., ILL., ZONING ORDINANCE § 37-701.3 (2015), https://www.municode.com/
library/il/dupage_county/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=CH37DUPACOZOOR_ARTVIIREDI_PT
2DIRE_37-701.3LORESIWIDEDI.
19. DENTON, TEX., DEV. ORDINANCE § 35.2.2 (2015), https://www.municode.com/
library/tx/denton/codes/development_ordinances
(map:
http://maps.cityofdenton.com/publicmaps/
(Select “map” > “map contents” > “zoning”)).
20. SUGAR LAND, TEX. LAND DEV. CODE § 2-65 (2015), https://www.municode.com/
library/tx/sugar_land/codes/land_development_code?nodeId=SUHITA_CH2ZORE_ARTIIZODILAUS
_PT2REESDI_S2-65DIRE
(map:
http://interactivemaps.sugarlandtx.gov/zoningdistricts/#map/e_10653100,3446680,-10640049,3452154,102100.
21. FAIRFAX CNTY. ZONING ORD. PT. P (2015), http://www.fairfaxcounty.gov/dpz/zoningordinance/
articles/art03.pdf
(map: http://www.fairfaxcounty.gov/dpz/comprehensiveplan/compplanmap20131107.pdf).
22. Master Plan Town of Norfolk, TOWN OF NORFOLK MASSACHUSETTS, pg. 15, (2007),
http://www.virtualnorfolk.org/public_documents/norfolkma_planning/masterplan11-15-07.pdf
(map:
http://www.virtualnorfolk.org/public_documents/norfolkma_planning/2014_Norfolk_Zoning_Map.pdf).
23. MARIN CNTY., CAL., DEV. CODE § 22.02.020, at I-10 (2015), http://www.marincounty.org/
~/media/files/departments/cd/planning/currentplanning/publications/marin-county-developmentcode/devcode_2013.pdf.
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Phoenix

Maricopa County,
Ariz.

R1-35: 35,000 sq. ft.
minimum24

Seattle

King County,
Wash.

RA-2.5: 1.875 acre
minimum25

Riverside County,
Cal.

R-1: 7,200 sq. ft.26

Miami-Dade
County, Fla.

EU-1: 2.5 acres27

Detroit

Macomb County,
Mich.

R-S-1: 30,000 sq. ft.
minimum28

Philadelphia

Buckingham
Township, Pa.

R-1: 1.8 acre
minimum29

Riverside/San
Bernardino
Miami/Ft.
Lauderdale

From the ubiquity of the phenomenon, one might infer that prohibitions
against small lots are an inherent part of land use zoning. But this is not the case.
In the landmark case of 1926 that signaled a green light for zoning laws, Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,30 the suburb of Euclid, Ohio imposed minimum lot
sizes, the largest of which was only 5,000 square feet (less than 71 feet on each
side).31 But the lot requirements were not the focus of the constitutional inquiry.32
It is true that the Court presciently considered—and approved—the practice of
what some call today “snob zoning”—that is, the favoring of zoning for wealthy
homeowners and the exclusion of low-cost housing.33 Reasoning that a “nuisance
may be merely a right thing in the wrong place, like a pig in the parlor instead of

24. MARICOPA CNTY., CAL., ZONING ORDINANCE 1 (2014), http://www.maricopa.gov/
planning/resources/ordinances/pdf/reform_ordinance/zoning%20ordinance.pdf
(map: http://gis.rdsa.maricopa.gov/plannet/).
25. KING CNTY., WASH., ZONING CODE § 21A.12.030 Densities and dimensions - residential and
rural zones (2015), http://www.kingcounty.gov/council/legislation/kc_code/24_30_Title_21A.aspx.
26. Article II – Land Use Districts, CITY OF SAN BERNARDINO, CALIFORNIA, 11-2 (2015),
http://planning.rctlma.org/Portals/0/zoning/ordnance/Ord.%20348.4791%20clean%20version.pdf.
27. MIAMI-DADE CNTY., FLA., ZONING DIST. ART. XXII (2015), https://library.municode.com/
HTML/10620/level2/PTIIICOOR_CH33ZO.html#TOPTITLE.
28. MACOMB CNTY., MICH. ZONING ORD. § 10.0504. (2015), https://www.municode.com/
library/mi/macomb_township,_(macomb_co.)/codes/zoning?nodeId=ZONING_ORDINANCE_ARTVR
EOMISUDIS_S10.0504SILI (map: http://www.macombcountymi.gov/MCPED/documents/planning/
macomb%20county%20generalized%20land%20use%20map%202004.pdf ).
29. BUCKINGHAM TWP., VA., ZONING ORDINANCE, § 802 (2010).
30. Vill. of Euclid, Ohio, v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
31. Id. at 381-82.
32. The Court relied on an analogy to the traditional common law doctrine of “nuisance” – by
which English and American courts had for centuries enjoined certain unpleasant uses of land, id. at
387-88, along with the related Latin maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, id. at 387, – in English,
“use your property in such a fashion so as not to disturb others.” DUHAIME’S LAW DICTIONARY,
DICTIONARY OF LATIN LAW MAXIMS & TERMS, Sic Utera Tuo Ut Alienam Non Laedas,
http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/Category/LatinLawTermsDictionary.aspx.
33. See, e.g., Paul K. Stockman, Anti-Snob Zoning in Massachusetts: Assessing One Attempt at
Opening the Suburbs to Affordable Housing, 78 VA. L. REV. 535 (1992) (discussing the phenomenon).
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the barnyard,”34 the Court concluded that apartment buildings in the suburbs may
be barred because they “come very near to being nuisances.”35 Although we may
recoil today at this condescension, the Court did not explicitly rule that small lots
likewise should be outlawed as being legally odiferous in the suburbs.
The typical rationales for lotting large, as discussed in Part III, do not depend
directly on Euclid’s analogy to nuisances. Rather, as analyzed in Part IV, the
practice of large lot zoning is best explained by the desire of existing homeowners
to restrain population density. This recognition will help lead to wise
recommendations for reform, analyzed in Part V. Before these steps, however, it is
worthwhile to identify the putative drawbacks of the policy of large lot zoning.
B. The Harms of Lotting Large: Cost, Spillover, Segregation, and Sprawl
Laws requiring minimum lot sizes have received remarkably little attention in
the legal literature, and only slightly more in the economic literature. Economists
have recognized that laws restricting the supply of housing drive up costs, which in
turn deter some potential migrants seeking housing in a desirable suburban area.36
But the role of large lot zoning in the modern debate over so-called “affordable
housing” has been modest. This is because much of the debate concerns housing
for the poorest segments of the population, who often rely on subsidies or publicly
built housing units.37 By contrast, lotting large affects all segments of the
population.
The most thoughtful assessment of large-lot zoning remains the work in 1969
by David Schoenbrod, then a recent graduate of the Yale Law School, and later
Professor Schoenbrod.38 Writing at a time that is now closer to Euclid than it is to
today, Schoenbrod cogently and concisely summed up some of the impetuses for
large lot zoning and its economic implications, and offered some intelligent ideas
for reform.39 This article updates these arguments, with more current studies, for
21st century America. Specifically, it identifies four significant concerns about the
effects of large-lot zoning: cost, spillover, segregation, and sprawl.

34. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388.
35. Id. at 395.
36. The most prominent economist writing about the exclusionary effects of zoning has been
Professor William Fischel. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME
VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES 3-4
(2001) (local government land use laws are driven by the preferences of current homeowners); William
A. Fischel, An Economic History of Zoning and a Cure for its Exclusionary Effects, 41 URB. STUD. 317
(2004). A study of the most famous political and litigation dispute over exclusionary zoning is
CHARLES M. HAAR, SUBURBS UNDER SIEGE (1998) (a history of the politics and law surrounding New
Jersey’s relevant litigation).
37. A landmark step in the effort to foster affordable housing for poor people was the litigation
concerning the exclusionary zoning practices of Mt. Laurel, New Jersey. In one of the New Jersey
Supreme Court decisions on the matter, the court identified techniques such as removing restrictions on
apartment construction, offering subsidies, mandating that a developer “set aside” a fraction of units in a
complex for low-cost housing, and encouraging the construction of mobile homes. S. Burlington Cnty.
NAACP v. Mount Laurel Twp. [hereinafter Mt. Laurel II], 456 A.2d 390, 442-51 (N.J. 1983)
(discussing a variety of “affirmative measures” to provide low-cost housing).
38. David S. Schoenbrod, Large Lot Zoning, 78 YALE L. J. 1418 (1969).
39. See id. at 1432-1441 (discussing ideas for reform).
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1. Large-lot zoning increases the cost of housing.
A regulation that makes it unlawful to build small house lots inflates the cost
of housing in a jurisdiction.40 Legally restraining supply increases cost.41 This
straightforward observation has been echoed by more focused analyses in the
decades since Schoenbrod’s article.42 For example, a recent Harvard economic
study concluded that “minimum lot size, which remains the most powerful and
widespread form of land-use control,” drives up the costs of housing.43 Restrictive
laws in the Boston area, whose suburbs were at the vanguard of large lot zoning,
have made it all but impossible to build new housing units near the city, even
during the early 21st century housing boom.44 A result is that house prices in the
Boston area have become among the most expensive in the nation.45
40. See id. at 1418 (referring to phenomenon created by those excluded by large-lot zoning as
“[b]idding up housing prices wherever they go”); id. at 1421 (“market value of each homeowner’s
property will rise as the lot size minimum is increased”). Schoenbrod’s conclusions were based on a
simple economic analysis of the concepts of supply and demand. See id. at 1420-1424 (explaining how
an increase in desirability – in other words, demand – increases prices).
41. See id. at 1422 fig. 1 (demonstrating homeowner satisfaction, which correlates with value,
increases with lot size, although with diminishing returns). In terms of economics, government
regulation of supply pushes the supply curve to the left, thus raising prices. See Al Ehrbar, Supply, THE
CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Supply.html (last visited
Oct. 30, 2015) (explaining the basics of supply and demand, including that prices rise when supply is
limited by some outside factor).
42. See Jenny Schuetz, Guarding the Town Walls: Mechanisms and Motives for Restricting
Multifamily Housing in Massachusetts 3 (Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies at Harvard Univ., W06-3, 2006),
available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/research/publications/guarding-town-walls-mechanisms-andmotives-restricting-multifamily-housing (large lot rules will result in “greater values” for houses). For a
recent empirical economic study of the effect on prices of large-lot zoning, and the conclusion that the
policy does indeed have an “economically significant [upward] impact on house prices,” see Maurice
Dalton & Jeffrey Zabel, The Impact of Minimum Lot Size Regulations on House Prices in Eastern
Massachusetts, 41 REGIONAL SCI. & URB. ECON. 571, 583 (2009). The question of how large-lot
zoning laws affect the price of land per acre is less clear. See Hans R. Isakson, Analysis of the Effect of
Large Lot Zoning, 26 J. REAL ESTATE RESEARCH 397 (2004).
For a subtle economic argument, under sets of limited assumption, that large-lot zoning is economically
efficient in certain instances, see Arthur M. Sullivan, Large-Lot Zoning as Second-Best Policy, 24 J.
REGIONAL SCI. 581 (1984). The scholar Charles Tiebout argued that restrictive zoning, along with other
local regulations, can be efficient in that it allows for a marketplace among prospective residents. See
Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POLIT. ECON. 416 (1956) (creating a
model of inter-municipal completion).
43. BRYCE WARD, JENNY SCHUETZ & EDWARD GLAESER, How large lot zoning and other town
(Jan.
1,
2006),
regulations
are
driving
up
home
prices,
COMMONWEALTH
http://commonwealthmagazine.org/uncategorized/how-large-lot-zoning-and-other-town-regulations-aredriving-up-home-prices/.
44. Id. at 2. Ward, Schuetz & Glaeser noted that the Boston area granted only 8,204 building
permits for new single-family houses in 2004, a peak year of the nation’s housing boom, largely because
of restrictive laws, in comparison to 31,741 in the Phoenix area. Prices in Phoenix were less than half
those in the Boston metro region. Id. at 1-2.
45. In 2005, the median price of a single-family house in the Boston area was higher than $400,000
($30,000 over what seems significantly different). Id. at 1. By 2010, it was still nearly $350,000. THE
BOS. FOUND., THE GREATER BOSTON HOUSING REPORT CARD 2012, at 43, tbl. 3.2 (2012). Of the
dozens of towns in the Boston area, those with minimum lot sizes larger than 70,000 (measurement?)
encompass ten percent of the region’s land, but only four percent of the region’s total population. Ward,
Schuetz & Glaeser, supra note 43, at 1.
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2. Large-lot zoning adversely affects people other than the suburb’s
existing homeowners.
The upward pressure on housing prices affects the “utilities”—that is, the
happiness—of diverse categories of persons differently. Recognizing this contrast
was among Schoenbrod’s most significant contributions.46 For persons who own
homes when a restrictive zoning law is imposed, the price increases positively
affect their utilities, because their homes are likely to rise in value, no matter the lot
size. Their homes become a scarce and thus relatively more valuable commodity.
Accordingly, the new law tends to be welcomed by entrenched homeowners, who
enjoy the resultant constraints on congestion and density.47 This “amenity effect”
increases the desirability of houses in this regulated community, thus further
driving up its prices—to the greater joy of the existing homeowners.48
By contrast, the price bump impairs the utilities of persons who seek to buy or
rent a house in this suburb.49 They seek scarce commodities, the prices of which
have been inflated by the government regulation.50 Moreover, persons who are
dissuaded or who are unable financially to migrate to these suburbs see their utility
decrease; they are compelled to settle for a lesser choice.51 Schoenbrod surmised
that such excluded home seekers “will probably live in the central city.”52 While
such an assumption might have been reasonable in 1969, when the stereotypical
migrant to a suburb was from the crowded central city, most suburban home
seekers in the current century move from other suburbs.53 As discussed below, a
more likely scenario in today’s America is that home seekers who are dissuaded by
large-lot zoning will move further out, to a more distant suburban jurisdiction
46. See Schoenbrod, supra note 38, at 1419-26, 1432 (explaining the “satisfaction” and other
benefits conferred by large-lot zoning laws on existing wealthy homebuyers, as opposed to other
citizens).
47. Schoenbrod, supra note 38, at 1420. The perceived social benefits of large-lot zoning are
discussed in greater detail in Part IV, infra.
48. See Paul D. Gottlieb, Anthony O’Donnell, Thomas Rudel, Karen O’Neill, and Melanie
McDermott, The impact of large-lot zoning and open space acquisition on homes building in rural
communities,
at
5
(2009)
http://www.academia.edu/8112691/The_impact_of_largelot_zoning_and_open_space_acquisition_on_home_building_in_rural_communities (discussing the
“amenity effect” and its shift of the demand curve to the right, increasing prices).
49. The price increase affects both homebuyers and renters to whom owners pass along some of the
added cost.
50. See Schoenbrod, supra note 38, at 1424-26 (explaining the decreased utility of persons who buy
houses after the price increase, with the total community’s utility expressed by curve B in figure 2).
Schoenbrod posited that total utility of homebuyers is maximized at point M, in which the average lot
size is smaller than the existing homebuyers’ preference for imposing laws to create an average lot size
of Z. See id. (explaining figure 2).
51. See Schoenbrod, supra note 38, at 1426-29 (showing the decreased utility to dissuaded home
seekers as curve C in figure 3).
52. Id. at 1427.
53. See, e.g., Wendell Cox, Special Report: Move to Suburbs (and Beyond) Continues, NEW
GEOGRAPHY (July 30, 2013) http://www.newgeography.com/content/001666-special-report-movesuburbs-and-beyond-continues (citing data from Texas and elsewhere); Joel Kotkin, The Geography of
Aging: Why Millennials are Moving to the Suburbs, NEW GEOGRAPHY (Dec. 9, 2013)
http://www.newgeography.com/content/004084-the-geography-of-aging-why-millennials-are-headedto-the-suburbs (an argument by a critic of the popular notion that today’s Americans prefer the cities to
the suburbs).
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where housing is cheaper because it is less conveniently located.
Finally, a suburb’s lotting large adversely affects the utility of persons wholly
outside the regulated suburb, even if they hold no desire to move to the suburb.
The constrained supply of housing in the regulated suburb pushes unmet demand to
other jurisdictions.54 The demand for housing in other jurisdictions increases, thus
driving up costs in these locations.55 This adverse impact on other jurisdictions is a
reason that one suburb’s adoption of large-lot zoning laws may encourage
neighboring governments to follow suit.56 In sum, we may safely conclude that
large-lot laws decrease the economic utility of all relevant segments of the
community, except for the homeowners who live in the community at the time the
restrictive law is imposed.
3. Large-lot zoning exacerbates social segregation.
A corollary of the cost effect of lotting large is that it often exacerbates
segregation by wealth and by race. Indeed, the exclusion of less affluent persons
might form another reason for a snobbish suburb to adopt such a law in the first
place.57 This is an example of “exclusionary zoning,” by which a jurisdiction’s
laws, intentionally or not, exclude persons of modest incomes.58 Moreover,
segregation by income is likely to be mirrored by segregation by race, simply
because black and Latino American households tend to have lower incomes than
white (and Asian) households.59 A suburb that imposes a two-acre house lot
minimum, for example, should expect that its population would be somewhat less
black or Latino than if it allowed for apartments with multiple units per acre.60
A law that creates a “disparate impact” on a protected race, even if the effect is
54. See Ward, Schuetz & Glaeser, supra note 43, at 4-5 (explaining the spillover effect).
55. See Schoenbrod, supra note 38, at 1427-29 (explaining that exclusion from the regulated suburb
causes increased demand elsewhere).
56. See id. at 1426 (“That the hypothetical suburb competes with others impels it to make full use of
its powers to raise the minimum lot size.”).
57. See id. at 1426 (“The suburb that falls behind in the zoning race may quickly became a target for
mass developers catering to the less wealthy spectrum of the homebuying market, thus burdening it with
unusually fast development and a loss of relative prestige.”); Schuetz, supra note 43,at 1 (noting
hypothesis that “residents prefer to live with neighbors of the same social class or race, so that affluent
or largely white suburbs will seek to exclude lower-income households of people of color through
restrictive zoning.”).
58. Perhaps the most famous exemplar of exclusionary zoning has been the epic litigation in New
Jersey, beginning in the late 1960s, from the town of Mt. Laurel. See generally CHARLES HAAR, supra
note 36 (analyzing the Mt. Laurel saga and applauding the “audacious judges” who fought exclusionary
zoning).
59. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2013 5 fig. 1
(2013) (income data by race), available at http://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/
publications/2014/demo/p60-249.pdf.
60. Matthew Resseger, The Impact of Land Use Regulation on Racial Segregation: Evidence from
Massachusetts Zoning Borders, at 33 (2013), http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/resseger/files/
resseger_jmp_11_25.pdf. Resseger concluded that “blocks zoned for multi-family housing have black
population shares 3.36 percentage points higher and Hispanic population shares 5.77 percentage points
higher than single-family zoned blocks directly across a border from them.” Id. at 1. For an earlier
study that reached a similar conclusion about the racial effects of lotting large, see Rolf Pendall, Local
Land Use Regulation and the Chain of Exclusion, 66 J. AM. PLANNING ASS’N 125 (2000), available at
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01944360008976094#.VMZup_7F_To.
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not intended, may violate the U.S. Fair Housing Act’s prohibition of conduct that
“make[s] unavailable or den[ies] . . . a dwelling … because of race.”61 By contrast,
a claim under the U.S. Constitution’s “equal protection” guarantee must prove an
intent to discriminate.62 Because few local governments act overtly enough to
show intent to discriminate, most challenges to the racial aspects of zoning rely on
the theory of disparate impact. Nonetheless, lower courts appear to be uneasy with
prima facie housing cases that rely solely on statistical evidence of adverse
impact.63 Accordingly, discrimination laws are uncertain tools, at best, to wield
against large-lot zoning laws.
4. Large-lot zoning harms the environment by spurring sprawl.
There is little doubt that large-lot zoning laws in suburban jurisdictions
exacerbate the phenomenon of suburban “sprawl” and its attendant environmental
harms. As explained below, this is because constraining construction in a
jurisdiction tends to push the demand for housing to places further from the city
center. Indeed, while lotting large is not the sole contributor to suburban sprawl, it
appears to be among the most significant.
Perhaps the earliest significant discussion of the connection between lotting
large was raised by John Anderson in 1974.64 Published during the first flush of
the green movement, when many Americans first heard the terms “environmental”
and “ecology,”65 the study cited a contemporary federal court decision, Steel Hill
Development Incorporated v. Town of Sanbornton, that upheld large lot zoning in a
rural New Hampshire town.66 The government relied on, and the court approved,
61. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. and Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 2507, 2526
(2015) (establishing the cognizability of a “disparate impact” claim under the statute); 42 U.S.C.
§ 3604(a) (2014).
62. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Auth., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977) (“Proof of
racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause”
of the 14th Amendment.).
63. See Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290, 1291-93 (7th
Cir. 1977) (discussing various factors). Challenging lotting large simply because it makes housing more
unaffordable for people of color can be countered by the argument that the practice makes housing more
unaffordable for similarly situated white persons. See, e.g., Reinhart v. Lincoln Cnty., 482 F.3d 1225,
1230 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that the plaintiffs “would need to show that the new regulations increase
the cost of a dwelling by some amount and then show that this increase disparately impacts the ability of
members of the protected group to buy a dwelling—that is, to the extent that the higher price reduces the
size of the purchaser market for the dwelling, the reduction is disproportionately high for the protected
group.”).
64. John Anderson, Environmental Considerations: New Arguments for Large Lot Zoning, 7 URB.
L. ANN., 370 (1974).
65. Most of the nation’s leading environmental statutes were adopted from the years 1969 to 1976,
including: the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(f), enacted in 1969; the
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671(q), signed into law in 1970; the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1387, adopted in 1972; the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544, established in
1973; and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6901-6992, which regulates
hazardous waste disposal, and which was enacted in 1976. The Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act (“CERCLA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671, which authorizes
the cleanup of hazardous waste sites, was signed into law in 1980.
66. See Anderson, supra note 64, at 370-375 (discussing Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of
Sanbornton, 338 F. Supp. 301 (D.N.H.), aff’d, 469 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1972)). When presented with a
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the rationale that the law would serve both aesthetic and ecological interests, such
as avoiding pollution and soil erosion.67 This case and others signaled the rise of
putatively environmental rationales for large-lot zoning, which today are routine,
especially as “open space” and “traffic congestion” are characterized as
environmental concerns.68 But the skepticism of marshaling the environment to
justify lotting large also began with Steel Hill. While the federal appellate court
noted approvingly the goals of preserving small-town “character” and “charm,”69 it
also concluded: “[W]e have serious worries whether the basic motivation of the
town … was not simply to keep outsiders, provided that they wished to come in
quantity, out of the town.”70
From these observations, we may develop a useful generalization about the
effects of large-lot zoning: A town’s lotting large will limit the population and
consequent environmental harms within its jurisdictional bounds, but it will
increase population and environmental injuries outside its boundaries. Consider a
metropolitan area with a strong demand for new housing. By constraining new
construction, a suburb’s large-lot zoning law will foster the utility of current
residents inside this jurisdiction, who welcome the preservation of the local
“character” and the avoidance of environment impacts that new migrants typically
create. But the demand for new housing in the metropolitan area remains. Persons
stymied by the suburb’s restraint on new construction turn to other locations.71
Today, we may state with confidence that most excluded home seekers will move
further out to distant suburbs with relatively favorable prices or favorable zoning
laws.72
There are many reasons why today’s home-searchers may prefer distant
suburban homes to central city ones. First, despite the much-ballyhooed revival of
certain popular cities in the 21st century, especially among young professional
apartment dwellers, a majority of Americans still hold a preference for a singlefamily house, the vast majority of which exist in suburban areas.73 Many central

proposal to build a “large” housing development, the town of Sanbornton hurriedly adopted a large-lot
zoning ordinance that required lots of at least three acres, thus squelching the financial viability of the
housing development's proposal. Id. at 370.
67. See Anderson, supra note 64, at 373, 379, citing Steel Hill Dev. Inc., 338 F. Supp. at 305-07. It
is worth noting that the U.S. District Court never used the words “ecological” or “environmental.”
68. See Part III for a discussion of the rationales employed to justify large-lot zoning.
69. Steel Hill Dev’t, Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956, 959-61 (1st Cir. 1972).
70. Id. at 962.
71. This is not meant to imply that all migrants to a metropolitan area seek housing in new
developments, of course. Many will choose older housing, as previous residents move away. But an
inevitable overall effect of a good economy or a growing population is to increase the demand for new
housing.
72. For a contrasting view from 1969, see Schoenbrod, supra note 38, at 1427 (asserting that
excluded person will probably “live in the central city”).
73. See, e.g., NAT’L ASS’N OF REALTORS, NATIONAL COMMUNITY PREFERENCE SURVEY (2013),
http://www.realtor.org/sites/default/files/reports/2013/2013-community-preference-analysis-slides.pdf
(survey from a somewhat biased source); Kris Hudson, Generation Y Prefers Suburban Home Over City
Condo, WALL. ST. J., Jan. 21, 2015 (survey concluding that 66% of Millennials prefer a house in the
suburbs than an apartment in the city); Pamela Engel & Rob Wile, 11 American Cities That Are Shells
Of Their Former Selves, BUSINESS INSIDER, June 26, 2013, http://www.businessinsider.com/american-
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cities remain tarred with a reputation for crime and poor schools.74 And of course
zoning laws in cities make new construction of largely undeveloped areas—
“infill”—difficult in many places.75 Moreover, while some home-seekers are
current residents of the central city, many others live in other suburbs, and thus
have few ties to the central city. Finally, central cities—almost all of which are
dwarfed in population by their suburbs, which cover much larger areas—are simply
too small to encompass more than a fraction of the nation’s growing 21st century
population.76
Portland, Oregon, and the Virginia suburbs of Washington D.C., two
economically vigorous American metropolitan areas, serve as examples of the
effect of lotting large in pushing new housing further out. Portland is surrounded
by an “urban growth boundary.” 77 The boundary has acted, since 1980, as a super
large-lot requirement, of sorts, by preserving farmland and making new housing
construction difficult outside the boundary, which cuts across the three Oregon
counties.78 The intent of the boundary was to control suburban sprawl.79 The city
also has been a vanguard for urban infill.80 But, according to a notable 2004 study,
cities-in-decline-2013-6 (highlighting the number of major American cities that are not experiencing a
revival).
74. See, e.g., EDWARD GLAESER, TRIUMPH OF THE CITY 3-7 (2011) (discussing the poor reputation
that cities earned in the 20th century).
75. See generally MATTHEW YGLESIAS, THE RENT IS TOO DAMN HIGH (Simon & Schuster 2013)
(discussing the legal barriers to infill in cities in high demand, such as New York).
76. For example, the nation’s most populous city, New York, holds only about 8.4 million persons
in a metro area of more than 19 million people. Most other examples are more extreme. Boston, for
example, has fewer than 700 thousand people in an area of 4.6 million persons. Compare data at U.S.
Bureau of the Census, Annual Estimates of the Resident Population for Incorporated Places Over
50,000, http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk, and
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Annual Estimates of the Resident Population: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2013 United States -- Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical Areas, http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/
tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk. Even the nation’s most notable exemplar of
urban growth over the past half-century – Phoenix – has experienced a slowdown in population growth
of its central city. Like many western cities, Phoenix encompasses a large area: more than 500 square
miles. The city’s population grew by more than 300,000 in the 1950s. But the first decade of the new
millennium saw Phoenix grow by fewer than 125,000 persons, despite the fact that most of this decade
witnessed a housing boom. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 34 tbl.
27 (2011), http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0027.pdf.
Most of the new
residents of the Phoenix metro area moved to suburban locations. The population of Maricopa County,
Ariz., which encompasses most of the Phoenix metro area, grew by more than 700,000 during the
decade, of which fewer than one in five was attributable to the central city. Census Viewer, Population
of Maricopa County, Ariz., http://censusviewer.com/county/AZ/Maricopa. Put simply, the city of
Phoenix is finally filling up.
77. Metro, Urban Growth Boundary, http://www.oregonmetro.gov/urban-growth-boundary.
“Metro” is the name of the multi-county governmental body that is responsible for the urban growth
boundary around Portland.
78. Id. (discussing the history of Portland’s Urban Growth Boundary).
79. 1000 Friends of Oregon, Oregon Cities Grow More, Expand Less than National Average (April
5, 2012) http://www.friends.org/latest/oregon-cities-grow-more-expand-less-national-average.
80. See id. (Referring to “investments in existing neighborhoods); City of Portland, Infill Design,
http://www.portlandoregon.gov/bps/34024?. For many years, up until 2012, Portland held a free
downtown public transportation area, called “Fareless Square.” Mason Walker, The death of Portland's
Fareless Square will have consequences, PORTLAND BUS. J., Sept. 12, 2012,
http://www.bizjournals.com/portland/blog/sbo/2012/09/the-death-of-portlands-fareless.html?page=all.

2016]

LOTTING LARGE

15

Portland’s growth boundary has not slowed down the process of suburbanization of
its metro population.81 Rather, it has simply pushed suburbanization across the
border to suburbs in Washington state.82
Another example is the Virginia suburbs of Washington, D.C, including
Loudoun and Fairfax Counties, which are among the most affluent jurisdictions in
the nation.83 Fairfax, which touches Washington, D.C., holds more than a million
people, while adjacent Loudon is still significantly rural.84 Satellite images
available on Google Earth show the effect of Fairfax’s lotting large at its western
boundary with Loudoun County, about twenty miles from downtown
Washington.85 On the Fairfax side, where housing is constrained by large-lot
zoning, houses are far apart and are separated by extensive lawns and woods.
Immediately across the border in Loudoun County, dense suburban housing on
curving streets pushes right up the boundary. It appears clear that Fairfax’s stricter
large-lot zoning laws have pushed new construction out to the more distant
suburban county.86
Having argued above that lotting large tends to shift housing development
further out, this section can now proceed to assigned to large-lot zoning some of
the blame for the environmental ills that are associated with suburban sprawl. The
essence of this environmental critique is that sprawling areas consume more
resources.87 Low density development is the culprit.88 Lotting large is a
81. MYUNG-JIN JUN, The Effects of Portland’s Urban Growth Boundary on Urban Development
Patterns and Commuting, 41 URB. STUD. 1333, 1333 (2004) (“Intermetropolitan comparisons do not
support the conclusion that Portland’s UGB has been effective in slowing down suburbanization,
enhancing infill development and reducing auto use.”).
82. Id. at 1346 (“Portland’s UGB has had little effect on drawing new residential development into
the UGB, but significant impact on diverting new growth into Clark County, Washington.”). Indeed, the
population of Clark County, Wash. has more than doubled since 1980. See Clark County, Washington,
WIKIPEDIA (Aug. 30, 2015, 2:11 PM) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clark_County,_Washington
(displaying compilation of census data).
83. Tom Jackman, The rich State of NoVa: Loudoun, Fairfax, Arlington top wealthiest U.S. counties
list (with P. Wm. rising), WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-stateof-nova/post/the-rich-state-of-nova-loudoun-fairfax-arlington-top-wealthiest-counties-list-with-pwmalex-rising/2012/09/20/b9bca078-032a-11e2-91e7-2962c74e7738_blog.html (citing recent census
estimates).
84. Northern Virginia counties are 'the engines' of state's growth, USATODAY,
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/census/profile/VA (last visited Oct. 29, 2015) (citing
Virginia county population numbers).
85. GOOGLE EARTH, http://www.earth.google.com (search for the location “39°02’ N, 77°21’ W”,
display “Borders and Labels”). This image shows that, immediately, along the boundary, denser housing
development commences. Panning out shows with greater clarity the effect of Fairfax’s tighter zoning
laws.
86. In fact, Loudoun’s population grew by 30,735 more people than Fairfax’s did from 2000 to
2010. Compare the census figures compiled at Fairfax County, Virginia, WIKIPEDIA (Aug. 31, 2015,
2:18 PM) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fairfax_County_Virginia, with those at Loudoun County,
WIKIPEDIA
(Aug.
29,
2015,
10:38
PM)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Virginia,
Loudoun_County,_Virginia.
87. See Wayne Batchis, Enabling Urban Sprawl: Revisiting the Supreme Court’s Seminal Zoning
Decision Euclid v. Ambler in the 21st Century, 17 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 373, 373-77 (2010)
(discussing a litany of environmental and social harms of sprawl); Michael E. Lewyn, Suburban Sprawl:
Not Just an Environmental Issue, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 301, 346-64 (2000) (focusing on economic
disruptions); Robert H. Freilich & Bruce G. Peshoff, The Social Costs of Sprawl, 29 URB. LAW. 183,
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contributing factor to the spread out use of land and low density. By definition, it
takes more land to provide for 1,000 households in a jurisdiction with a one-acre
minimum lot size law than in a community that allows small lots or apartments.
Even Schoenbrod (who assumed that most home seekers that are frustrated by
lotting large would resort to city living) recognized that large-lot zoning “rapidly
consumes what little countryside exists within a reasonable distance from the
central city.”89 It is true that large lot laws typically result in some form of “open
space,” in the sense of lawns and woods. But because these lands belong to a
variety of private homeowners—each of whom is likely to wish for an expanse of
grass and a driveway among other things—lotting large results in a checkerboard
land use, not in large, unbroken expanses of meadows, forests, or wetlands. 90 For
nature and wildlife, large and uninterrupted areas are preferable to a patchwork.91
This is why suburbs are characterized as a good place for deer, squirrels, and
sparrows, but a poor place for other species.92
Similarly, although lotting large is sometimes employed as a method of
preventing farmland from being developed into dense housing,93 the laws typically
do little to ensure the preservation of viable farms.94 Few successful farms can

191-93 (1997) (focusing on social issues); see also SIERRA CLUB, SPRAWL COSTS US ALL: HOW YOUR
TAXES FUEL SUBURBAN SPRAWL (2000), http://vault.sierraclub.org/sprawl/report00/sprawl.pdf.
(discussing a litany of putative ills of sprawl that impose “costs” on the environment and society).
88. See, e.g., E.P.A., Urban Sprawl, ALMANAC OF POLICY ISSUES (2003)
http://www.policyalmanac.org/environment/archive/urban_sprawl.shtml (defined as “low density,
automobile dependent development”); ANDRES DUANY & ELIZABETH PLATER-ZYBERK, SUBURBAN
NATION 3 (2001) (critiquing low density development as the quintessence of unwise suburban sprawl);
see also Richard B. Peiser, Density and Urban Sprawl, 65 LAND ECON. 193, 193 (1989) (arguing that
density and contiguous development do not always coincide).
89. Schoenbrod, supra note 38, at 1431.
90. The satellite image of western Fairfax County, Va., at 39°02’ N, 77°21’ W, shows a typical
large lot landscape of a patchwork of lawns and woods. GOOGLE EARTH, supra note 85. For a
discussion of the adverse effect on undeveloped natural land, see Tim Evans, Op-Ed, Large-Lot Zoning
Responsible for Rapid Loss of Open Lands, THE RECORD (Bergen Cnty., N.J.), July 31, 2011,
http://www.njfuture.org/news/op-ed-articles/large-lot-zonin/.
91. In biogeography, the debate is referred to as “SLOSS,” or “single large or several small?”
Tormod Vaaland Burkey, Extinction in Nature Reserves: The Effect of Fragmentation and the
Importance of Migration Between Reserve Fragments, 55 OIKOS 75, 75 (1988). Most writers have
advocated the former. See id. (noting the benefits of single large); Jared M. Diamond, The Island
Dilemma: Lessons of Modern Biogeographic Studies for the Design of Natural Reserves, 7 BIOLOGICAL
CONSERVATION 129, 129 (1975) (“Larger reserves . . . can hold more species.”); see generally ROBERT
H. MACARTHUR & EDWARD O. WILSON, THE THEORY OF ISLAND BIOGEOGRAPHY (1967) (identifying
the importance of the question whether species richness is fostered better by one large or several small
“islands” of populations).
92. U.S.D.A., SOUTHERN FOREST RESOURCES ASSESSMENT, EFFECTS OF URBANIZATION ON
FOREST WILDLIFE 7 (2013), http://www.srs.fs.usda.gov/sustain/report/terra3/terra3-13.htm (discussing
that fragmented landscape decreases the number of species in favor of a handful of “edge” species such
as deer and squirrels).
93. See, e.g., C & M Developers, Inc. v. Bedminster Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 820 A.2d 143, 14647 (Pa. 2002); see also other examples in Part III, infra.
94. The mean size of a crop farm in the United Sates was 235 acres in 2011. JAMES M.
MACDONALD, PENNI KORB, & ROBERT A. HOPPE, U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC., FARM SIZE AND THE
ORGANIZATION OF U.S. CROP FARMING 4 (2013), http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/1156726/err152.pdf.
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prosper on only an acre or two.95 Indeed, even when governments label a zoning
district as “agricultural,” they often require merely a large lot, not that the owners
must be farmers.96
By spreading houses out, lotting large also necessitates more automobile
travel. Due in part to these zoning patterns, Americans move more by car and
truck than do people in other nations.97 This results in more air pollution, more
pavement, higher auto-maintenance costs, and more time spent sitting in traffic
congestion.98
Despite the auto emission constraints of the U.S. Clean Air Act,99 the United
States emits more carbon dioxide from vehicles per person than any other wealthy
nation.100 Moreover, by encouraging bigger houses, large lot zoning increases the
amount of energy needed to heat, cool, and light.101 American houses are
significantly larger than those in other rich nations. At more than 2,400 square
feet,102 the average new American house is nearly double the size of its
counterparts in affluent countries such as Sweden, Germany, and Britain.103 The
combination of longer travels and larger houses contributes to America’s standing
as one of the worst offenders in the greenhouse gas pollution that is changing the
globe’s climate.104 For example, the typical American was responsible, as of 2010,
95. The average farm in the United States is 441 acres. Agric. Council of Am., Agriculture Fact
Sheet, http://www.agday.org/media/factsheet.php (2015).
96. For example, Sacramento County, Cal., allows lots as small as one acre in its
“Agricultural/Residential Zoning District” designated as “A-1.” Sacramento Cnty., Cal., Summary of
Zoning Classifications, 1 (2007) http://www.per.saccounty.net/LandUseRegulationDocuments/
Documents/ZoningCodes/ZoningClassSummary.pdf.
97. See Office of Highway Policy Info., Annual Automobile Vehicle Miles of Travel (VMT) per
Capita and Number of Automobiles per Capita 1997, FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN.,
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ohim/onh00/bar4.htm (last modified Feb. 20, 2015) (higher mileage for
American drivers than for those in other wealthy nations).
98. For a wide-ranging discussion of the costs of the automobile-dependent culture, see generally
JANE HOLTZ KAY, ASPHALT NATION (1997); SIERRA CLUB, CLEARING THE AIR WITH TRANSIT
SPENDING, 5-8 (2001), http://vault.sierraclub.org/sprawl/report00/sprawl.pdf (discussing sprawl’s
exacerbation of air pollution).
99. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7521-7590 (2006).
100. Adam Millard-Ball & Lee Schipper, Are We Reaching Peak Travel? Trends in Passenger
Transport in Eight Industrialized Countries, 31 TRANSPORT REV. 357, 360 fig. 1 (2011).
101. See Barry Fischer, America’s energy distribution: the top 1% of homes consume 4 times more
electricity than average (and why it matters), OPOWERBLOG.COM (March 6, 2013),
http://blog.opower.com/2013/03/americas-energy-distribution-the-top-1-of-homes-consume-4-timesmore-electricity-than-average-and-why-it-matters/(last visited Oct. 29, 2015) (citing a variety of
statistics showing that larger houses use more electricity).
102. Christopher Ingraham, The McMansion is back, and bigger than ever, WASH. POST., Feb. 26,
2015,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2015/02/26/the-mcmansion-is-back-andbigger-than-ever/ (last visited Sep. 5, 2015) (citing Census data).
103. Lindsay Wilson, How big is a house? Average house size by country, SHRINK THAT FOOTPRINT,
http://shrinkthatfootprint.com/how-big-is-a-house (citing 2009 data). Only Australia, a country with a
much lower national population density, holds somewhat larger houses. Australia & U.S. Have Largest
Houses, DEMOGRAPHIA, http://www.demographia.com/db-hsize.pdf (2013).
104. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: SYNTHESIS
REPORT, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 2 (2014), https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/
AR5_SYR_FINAL_SPM.pdf (“Human influence on the climate system is clear, and recent
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases are the highest in history.”).
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for about double the amount of greenhouse gas pollution as counterparts in Britain,
Japan, and Germany.105
Lotting large also imposes financial strains on local governments, which often
must pay for the infrastructure of new roads, sewer lines, and schools to serve areas
that are far away from existing services.106 Although “impact fees” on developers
may recover some of the cost to local governments, as do property taxes,107 these
collections often do not fully recoup the financial expenses incurred by
governments that must serve housing that is built far from existing infrastructure.108
Finally, sprawling development contributes to a variety of social ills, according
to some commentators.109 By discouraging pedestrianism and by encouraging a
sedentary lifestyle inside large houses, sprawl contributes to the nation’s epidemic
of obesity.110 Denser housing, by contrast, encourages walking and exercise.
Similarly, the separation of households may add to a sense of social isolation—a
point recognized by Betty Freidan in The Feminine Mystique, a groundbreaking
1963 criticism of postwar American suburbia,111 and by others since then.112
In the litany of arguments against suburban sprawl, some may be more
convincing than others. But there is little dispute as to a solution to the putative ills
of suburban sprawl. Nearly all critics recommend some variant of the idea of
“smart growth”—that is, generally, a greater density of housing development on a
smaller amount of land.113 This, of course, is precisely what large lot zoning laws
prevent.
105. See WORLD BANK, CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita), http://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/EN.ATM.CO2E.PC?order=wbapi_data_value_2010+wbapi_data_value+wbapi_data_valuefirst&sort=desc (2015).
106. See generally SIERRA CLUB, supra note 87, at 3-5 (summarizing data for utilities, schools, fire,
and police, and other costs usually born by local governments).
107. See Am. Planning Ass’n, Policy Guide on Impact Fees (1997) https://www.planning.org/
policy/guides/adopted/impactfees.htm (discussing the theory and practice of the fees).
108. See SIERRA CLUB, supra note 87, at 10-12 (comparing costs to government with money
received from impact fees and taxes). For a survey of the nation’s impact fees, showing the tremendous
variety and variability of the practice, see Duncan Assoc., National Impact Fee Survey,
http://impactfees.com/publications%20pdf/2012_survey.pdf (2012).
109. See Freilich & Peshoff, supra note 87, at 191-93 (analyzing sprawl’s effects on community,
traffic, and “quality of life”); Sprawl Costs, NEW URBANISM, http://www.newurbanism.org/
sprawlcosts.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2015) (discussing isolation and obesity).
110. Howard Frumkin, Urban Sprawl and Public Health, 117 PUBLIC HEALTH REPORTS, 205 (2002),
http://www.cdc.gov/healthyplaces/articles/Urban_Sprawl_and_Public_Health_PHR.pdf.
111. See generally BETTY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE (1963) (arguing that post-war
suburban housewives led dull and unfulfilling lives).
112. See Freilich & Peshoff, supra note 87, at 191-93 (arguing that sprawl discourages community
involvement); Frumkin, supra note 110, at 207-09 (discussing the adverse effects on “social capital”).
113. For a sampling of the legal literature on “smart growth,” see Michael Lewyn, You Can Have It
All: Smart Growth and Property Rights Too, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 1093, 1104-14 (2007) (discussing the
centrality of density in “smart growth”); Richard Briffault, Smart Growth and American Land Use Law,
21 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 253, 254 (2002) (advocating for density). For a sampling in the world of
urban planning, see Smart Growth America, Encourage cities and counties to permit more multifamily
and higher density housing, http://www.smartgrowthamerica.org/guides/smart-growth-at-the-state-andlocal-level/housing-policy/encourage-cities-and-counties-to-permit-more-multifamily-and-higherdensity-housing/; Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors, Creating Great Neighborhoods: Density in Your Community
(2003) http://www.epa.gov/smartgrowth/pdf/density.pdf (written with the cooperation of the U.S. Env’t.
Prot. Agency).
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C. The Irony of Large Lots for Smaller American Households
A full assessment of lotting large must take into account the recent and
profound changes in the United States population. The nation’s population
continues to grow, as it always has.114 As of 2015, the American population of
more than 320 million swells by one person every fifteen seconds, and more than
two million new persons per year.115 About half of this growth is attributable to
more births than deaths, and half to migrants from other nations (illegal migration
makes the total figure somewhat unreliable).116 Each year, more than two million
Americans turn eighteen years old, and two million others turn twenty-one. 117
Unlike in Britain, in which there is a movement to cap its population,118 Americans
appear to welcome perpetual growth. Political liberals favor looser immigration
laws, while political conservatives support the suppression of abortion.119
Economists note the economic advantages of a rising population, especially with
the increase of younger workers, whose taxes pay for the benefits awarded to the
swelling ranks of retirees.120 These new Americans need housing.
Exacerbating the need for new housing in the United States is the decreasing
size of the typical household—a term that refers to one or more persons living as a
unit. The average size of a household has fallen from more than 3.5 persons in
1950, at the dawn of mass suburbanization and adoption of large-lot zoning laws,
to about 2.5 persons, as of 2013 data.121 The most common composition of a
household today is one person living alone; the share of single-person households
has risen from only 13 percent in 1960 to more than 27 percent as of 2015.122 The
boom in single-person households is driven both by the fact that more young
people choose to live alone and that elderly people are living longer. Fewer than

114. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Population Clock, http://www.census.gov/popclock (accessed Feb.
17, 2015).
115. Id. The net growth of one person every 14 seconds, id., yields a yearly increase of more than
two million persons.
116. Id.
117. Id. The age distribution shows that, for all ages below sixty-five, the share of persons for each
age is greater than one percent of the population of more than 320 million or, accordingly, more than
three million persons for each age.
MCDOUGALL,
THE
UK’S
POPULATION
PROBLEM
(2010),
118. See
ROSAMUND
https://www.populationmatters.org/wp-content/uploads/population_problem_uk.pdf (discussing the
concerns over Britain’s population growth).
119. For a discussion of the standard positions on issues among the American political spectrum see
Allen Clifton, The Differences Between Liberals and Conservatives on Key Issues, FORWARD
PROGRESSIVES (Apr. 11, 2013), http://www.forwardprogressives.com/the-differences-between-liberalsand-conservatives-on-key-issues/.
120. See, e.g., DAVID E. BLOOM, DAVID CANNING, & JAYPEE SEVILLA, THE DEMOGRAPHIC
DIVIDEND (2002) (RAND Corporation report on the economic benefits of a large and growing
population); Bernardo Villegas, Benefits of Large and Young Population (2009), bernardovillegas.org
(young people tend to work harder and pay more taxes than do older people).
121. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HOUSEHOLD SIZE: 1940 TO PRESENT (2014),
https://www.census.gov/hhes/families/files/graphics/HH-6.pdf.
122. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HOUSEHOLDS WITH ONE PERSON, 1960 TO PRESENT (2014),
https://www.census.gov/hhes/families/files/graphics/HH-4.pdf.
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half of all households include any minor children.123
As a result of the shrinking household size, the total number of American
households rose to more than 116 million in 2010 124—twice the number in 1960.125
The most compelling statistic is that the United States adds, in the 21st century,
more than one million new households each year.126 Each of these million new
households needs some housing in which to live. Because of the steadily rising
number of households, in a nation of a fixed size,127 American legal policies need
to permit the construction of new housing. However, our zoning laws remain
largely predicated on a Euclid-era notion of deference to the wisdom of local laws
to restrain new housing, in order to further the welfare of affluent families with
children. The persistence of this ideal, which is elaborated in Part III, comes at the
expense of other segments of the growing and changing American society.
III. JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO LOTTING LARGE
As with many areas of social and economic regulation, American courts defer
to laws requiring large lots.128 Courts typically uphold such laws, as long as the
government offers some rational reason for them.129 Because of the entrenched
nature of this attitude, courts are unlikely to serve as the vehicle for reform of
lotting large.
The idea of intensive regulation of buildings and houses began in the
“Progressive Era” of the early 20th century.130 The notion of segregating
permissible land uses through “zones” quickly was adopted by places as small as
123. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HOUSEHOLDS AND FAMILIES: 2010 [hereinafter HOUSEHOLDS
fig. 1 (2012).
124. Id. at tbl.2, http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-14.pdf.
125. There were fewer than fifty-three million households in 1960. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
HOUSEHOLDS BY SIZE: 1960 TO PRESENT (2004), http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hhfam/tabHH-4.pdf.
126. HOUSEHOLDS AND FAMILIES: 2010, supra note 123, tbl. 2, http://www.census.gov/
prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-14.pdf (showing that the number of households rose by more than 11
million in the ten years from 2000 to 2010). One more recent estimate put the number of households at
more than 122 million in 2013. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED
STATES: 2013, at 23, tbl. 2 (2014), http://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/
2014/demo/p60-249.pdf.
127. Because of sea level rise, the size of the United States is in fact shrinking slightly and will
continue to do so. Sam Roberts, Don’t Worry, Census Says, but the U.S. Is Shrinking, N. Y. TIMES,
April 29, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/30/us/30land.html?_r=0 (citing census data about a
slowly shrinking land mass).
128. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981) (deference to
“economic” regulation); N.Y. Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) (an example of the
deferential “rational basis” review in cases that do not implicate strict scrutiny based on race or gender
discrimination).
129. See, e.g., Armour v. City of Indianapolis, Ind., 132 S. Ct. 2073, 2080-81 (2012) (holding that a
review court must apply a “rational basis” review in an equal protection challenge to a social or
economic regulation, under which the government will prevail if there is “a plausible policy reason” for
the choice).
130. The term “Progressive Era” was coined in honor of the Progressive Party, founded by former
President Theodore Roosevelt, who ran unsuccessfully for re-election in 1912. See generally G.E.
MOWRY, THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT (1946) (discussing its formation
and ideals).
AND FAMILIES: 2010],

2016]

LOTTING LARGE

21

Euclid, Ohio, whose zoning ordinance was scrutinized and upheld by the U.S.
Supreme Court in 1926.131 In addition to zoning different uses, the Euclid
ordinance imposed minimum sizes of houses and house lots.132 Through its clear
discrimination against apartments and small houses, Euclid not only slowed its
population growth,133 but also discouraged potential migrants with low incomes.
Indeed, a U.S. District Judge initially ruled against the constitutionality of the
zoning law, concluding that its effect was to “classify the population and segregate
them according to their income or situation in life.”134
The Supreme Court that decided Euclid was noted for its conservative
skepticism of Progressive era legislation, most notably Lochner v. United States.135
But the Court diverged from its laissez faire reputation in upholding zoning
regulations.136 The landmark opinion was notable for its sympathy for the affluent
suburban homeowner who wished to keep annoyances far away. Zoning laws,
according to the Court, further the “health and safety of the community.”137
Discrimination against apartments was justified because such buildings “destroy[]”
the “residential character of a neighborhood” and “come very near to being
nuisances,” 138 such as the pig in the parlor.139
The Court also approved of the notion that local laws should be decided by
current residents of the jurisdiction, not by metropolitan interests: “[T]he village,
though physically a suburb of Cleveland, is politically a separate municipality, with
. . . authority to govern itself as it sees fit.”140 Through this milestone decision,
which was the only high court ruling on land use law for more than half a century,
the Court gave its imprimatur to two hallmarks of suburban zoning law: that a
locality may ignore the potential housing needs of its region, and that a suburb may
discriminate against modest-cost housing. The Euclid decision opened the door for
local governments to be ever-more intrusive in crafting laws that favor the social
and economic desires of its current residents.
Although the first instance of a large-lot zoning law is obscure, cases
131. Vill. of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 379-80 (1926).
132. To 21st century eyes, the minimum requirements seem small: houses in A-4 could be as small as
900 square feet (and only 700 square feet for corner lot houses). Id. at 381-82. These limits, in an age
of large families, are a testament to the early 20th century acceptance of a more cramped living style
than is associated with 21st century suburban ideals of large rooms, home-theater systems, and
enormous chairs. Today, most zoning laws on house sizes restrict the maximum bulk and heights, in
order to provide space and light for neighbors.
133. The population numbers show Euclid’s rapid transformation from a small town to a suburb in
the early 20th century. In 1910 it held only 1,953 persons; ten years later, it held 3,363 persons. During
the boom years of the 1920s, auto-driven suburbanization pushed the population up to 12,751. Euclid,
Ohio, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euclid,_Ohio (last visited Sept 16, 2015) (displaying a
compilation of decennial census figures).
134. Ambler Realty Co. v. Vill. of Euclid, Ohio, 297 F. 307, 316 (D. Ohio 1924), rev’d, 272 U.S. 365
(1926).
135. Lochner v. N.Y., 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down a law that limited working hours for
bakers).
136. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 365.
137. Id. at 391.
138. Id. at 394-95.
139. Id. at 388.
140. Id. at 389.
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challenging minimum lot size laws were first decided by courts in the 1940s.141
The most notable was Simon v. Town of Needham, decided in 1942.142 Needham is
a suburb of Boston, about twelve miles west of the city center.143 As a New
England “town,” it holds a fairly large area of nearly thirteen square miles, which
encompassed some farmland; like most suburban areas, it experienced rapid growth
in the early twentieth century.144 The town imposed a 7,000-square foot lot size
minimum in 1931; ten years later, it changed the minimum for the south side of
town to one acre (43,560 square feet).145 The dramatic legal change occurred only
days after the plaintiff’s purchase of land on the south side, with a plan to subdivide
the land into small house lots.146
In approving the zoning change, the state court echoed the reasoning in Euclid.
It was the prerogative of the town’s government to decide what is best for the town,
in spite of property rights arguments.147 The court reasoned that restraints on new
construction “prevent[ed] overcrowding,” “avoid[ed] congestion,” and ensured
“adequate light, air and sunshine.”148 To these assertions, the court added a fiscal
rationale that became more appealing to later generations: that the town
government probably would need to furnish “water, light, sewer and other public
necessities” to the new houses.149 This justification for restrictive laws—that
governments must provide costly “infrastructure” or “capital facilities” for new
houses—would become a bedrock argument for tighter laws on home building in
the second half of the twentieth century.150
141. However, in the 1920s, there were examples of laws imposing maximum household density for
apartment buildings; these laws were, in effect, restrictions on height and bulk, rather than on lot size.
See, e.g., Barker v. Swtizer, 209 A.2d 151 (N.Y. 1924) (striking down a maximum of 10 units per acre
in close-in suburb New Rochelle, N.Y., because New York state’s enabling law did not at the time allow
for such restraints). In the 1920s, the U.S. Department of Commerce published a Standard State Zoning
Enabling Act, which was a model for state laws to grant to local governments broad powers, including
the power to regulate for “open spaces” and “the density of population.” See U.S. Dep’t of Commerce,
Standard State Zoning Enabling Act § 1 (1926), https://www.planning.org/growingsmart/pdf/
SZEnablingAct1926.pdf.
142. Simon v. Town of Needham, 42 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1942).
143. Interestingly, the Massachusetts high court referred to the town’s area in acres, not square miles
– a practice typical of farmers, not city dwellers. Id. at 517.
144. Needham’s population grew from about 5,000 persons in 1910 to about 12,500 in 1940.
Needham, Mass., WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Needham,_Massachusetts (last updated Aug.
22, 2015) (displaying a compilation of decennial census population data).
145. Id. at 561.
146. Simon, 42 N.E.2d at 517. Tellingly, the court did not comment on the timing of events – the
plaintiff’s contract to purchase the land in “early June,” followed by the radical change in the zoning law
on “June 21” – other than to take pains to point out that the plaintiff’s purchase was not recorded until
July. Id.
147. Id. at 517.
148. Id. at 518. The court did not note whether there was evidence presented as to the effect of
houses on small lots on the supply of “air, light, and sunshine.”
149. Id.
150. See, e.g., DAVID L. CALLIES, ROBERT H. FREILICH, & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE 521,
770-74 (6th ed. 2012) (setting forth arguments that restrictive land use laws on house construction are
justified because of the infrastructure costs to the government generated by such houses). This
justification may prove to be time bound. In the early days of American settlement, homesteaders did
not rely on government infrastructure; they drew water from wells or streams, they lighted their houses
with candles or oil, and they disposed of their waste in pits on their land. In the twenty-first century,
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The Needham court also relied on an argument that perhaps would have
appealed to the affluent justices who decided Euclid: that it is pleasant to live on a
large lot. The court wrote that “[t]he advantages enjoyed by those living in one
family dwellings located upon an acre lot might be thought to exceed those
possessed by persons living upon a lot of ten thousand square feet.”151 This is no
doubt true, but this argument is at best an example of paternalism, and at worst a
fatuity. It may be restated as follows: Law should restrain people from making
frugal choices because it is more enjoyable to be extravagant.152
The court then turned to a more telling argument: “The benefits derived by
those living in such a neighborhood must be considered with the benefit that would
accrue to the public generally who resided in Needham by the presence of such a
neighborhood.”153 In other words, the presence of large lots increases the property
values of nearby lots. This observation helps understand the popularity of lotting
large among local governments. True, the court recognized the potential for zoning
to become a tool of the wealthy, asserting that a law “cannot be adopted for the
purpose of setting up a barrier against the influx of thrifty and respectable citizens
who [are barred by restrictive laws] . . . for the purpose of protecting the large
estates that are already located in the district.”154 Nonetheless, applying an attitude
of deference, under which a single justifiable rationale is sufficient, the court
upheld the restriction.155
The Needham court also addressed a critical concern that was all but ignored in
Euclid: the fact that all suburban jurisdictions in a metro area may choose to lot
large. Of the eight towns near Needham, six held laws requiring minimum lot
sizes.156 This might have led to a worry that the poor and middle-class were, in
effect, being zoned out of much of suburban Boston.157 But, ironically, the state

many suburban jurisdictions require developers either to build the infrastructure themselves, or to pay an
“impact fee” to cover the costs, or both. See, e.g., Ronald Rosenberg, The Changing Culture of
American Land Use Regulation: Paying for Growth with Impact Fees, 59 SMU L. Rev. 177 (2006)
(discussing broadly the practice of fees).
151. Simon, 42 N.E.2d at 518.
152. Surely, it may be “better” to buy a luxury sedan than an inexpensive coupe, because of the
former’s greater comfort, better safety features, and higher resale value; but it would be folly for
government to prohibit a citizen from purchasing a small vehicle, if only because many people cannot
afford the larger car.
153. Simon, 42 N.E.2d at 518.
154. Id. at 519.
155. Id. at 519-20.
156. Id. at 518.
157. The fact that one suburb’s desire for restraints on housing may be replicated among others,
resulting in region-wide restrictions, has been recognized by many courts. See, e.g., Associated Home
Builders of the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 557 P.2d 473, 487 (Cal. 1976)
(“[M]unicipalities are not isolated islands remote from the needs and problems of the area in which they
are located; thus an ordinance, superficially reasonable from the limited viewpoint of the municipality,
may be disclosed as unreasonable when viewed from a larger perspective.”); S. Burlington Cnty.
NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 723 (N.J. 1975) (recognizing the problem of
replication of exclusionary zoning laws across suburbs). The reference to suburbs as “islands” that act
in little regard for the region’s housing needs is a nod to a famous and influential article. Lawrence
Gene Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L.
REV. 767 (1969). Among other things, this article helped popularize the term “exclusionary zoning,”
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court used this fact to help justify the law, concluding that “it is persuasive that
many other communities when faced with an apparently similar problem have
determined that the public interest was best served by the adoption of a restriction .
. . .”158 The fact that a phenomenon is widespread may assure a judge that one
instance is not revolutionary, but it does nothing to ensure that the law is either
constitutional or wise, especially when the law harms “discrete and insular
minorities”159 who cannot even vote for the representatives that have enacted the
law.160
As a whole, however, the reasoning in Simon v. Town of Needham set a
template for courts in the second half of the twentieth century. Applying
deferential scrutiny, courts have almost uniformly accepted local governments’
assertions that lotting large serves the public welfare by restraining congestion,
limiting public infrastructure costs, offering a pleasant environment, and propping
up local property values. Most of these cases have arisen in affluent suburbs that
faced the prospect of significant population growth.161
For example, the Supreme Court of New Jersey in 1952 affirmed lotting large
in Bedminster Township, which is about 50 miles west of Manhattan.162 Noting
the precedent of Euclid for addressing “urban problems,” the court wrote that, “[a]s
much foresight is now required to preserve the countryside for its best use as has
been needed to save what could be salvaged of our cities.”163 The court did not
address the fact that the United States was experiencing a baby boom—the nation’s
population would more than double from 1950 to 2010164—and that its new
which encompasses all efforts of a government to use its land use laws to keep out those whom it does
not want.
158. Simon, 42 N.E.2d at 518.
159. This is famous language from U.S. v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), which
set forth the foundation for “strict scrutiny” of laws that adversely affect racial minorities.
160. Local governments are elected by the current citizens of the suburb, not by those who might
wish to move to the suburb. Thus, for example, a schoolteacher who was hired by the growing school
system of Needham in 1940, and who might have been frustrated by an inability to find a house or
apartment in Needham on a single schoolteacher’s salary, had no recourse through the ballot, because
this schoolteacher was not eligible to vote in Needham’s elections.
161. For example, a New York court in 1950 summarily upheld a two-acre minimum ordinance,
relying on deference to “an elastic application of the police power” and to the town’s judgment as to the
“character of the village.” Dilliard v. Vill. of N. Hills, 276 A.D. 969, 969 (N.Y. App. Div. 1950). Later
that year, another New York court upheld a 20,000 square foot lot minimum. Gignoux v. Vill. of Kings
Point, 99 N.Y.S.2d 280 (1950). This panel concluded that it was “wholly understandable” for the
locality to provide “a relief from the densely populated areas adjacent to a great city,” id. at 284, and
applauded the municipality’s efforts to “preserve the exclusive, high class and rural aspects of the
community” – a remarkable ideal for a town that is literally adjacent to Queens, New York City. Id. at
286. Similarly, the Supreme Court of Missouri in 1952 upheld a series of lotting large requirements, up
to three acres, in the rich St. Louis suburb of Ladue, Missouri, reasoning that an “intrusion of smaller
lots into such an area will have the effect of materially impairing the value of the buildings already
constructed.” Flora Realty & Inv. Co. v. City of Ladue, 246 S.W.2d 771, 776 (Mo. 1952) (en banc).
The court also concluded that the plaintiff’s plan to subdivide dozens of acres would “unbalance” the
city’s plan for schools, police, and other city services. Id. at 776.
162. Fischer v. Bedminster Twp., 93 A.2d 378, 383-84 (N.J. 1952). Bedminster is in Somerset
County, NJ.
163. Id. at 382-83.
164. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Resident Population Data, http://www.census.gov/
2010census/data/apportionment-pop-text.php (1950 population was only 151,325,798).
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citizens would need someplace to live, especially in the suburban areas of its
largest city. But the court’s reference to preserving the countryside hinted at a new
ground—environmental protection—that would constitute yet another arrow in the
quiver of legal arguments to justify lotting large. The environmental revolution of
the 1960s and 1970s165 would give governments a new basis for validation—one
that appealed to liberals, and that balanced the property-values justification that
appealed to conservatives.
Challenges to minimum lot sizes have diminished in number in recent decades,
simply because the battles have been fought and won by the governments.166
Lotting large has become a settled part of the American social framework, like
political platitudes about the “middle class” and formulaic Hollywood movies.
Because facial challenges to lotting large are doomed to failure by the deference
granted to government under “rational basis” review,167 landowners who chafe at
large lot zoning must look for other methods of attacks. In addition to a procedural

165. See, e.g., Jerry L. Anderson, The Environmental Revolution at Twenty-Five, 26 RUTGERS L. J.
395 (1995) (discussing the “environmental revolution” of the late 1960s and early 1970s).
166. In the 21st century, facial challenges are disposed of quickly through the incantations of the
public welfare benefits of restraining traffic congestion and preserving nature and farms. Two examples
from the new millennium will suffice. In a recent case from Highland Park, Ill., an affluent suburb north
of Chicago, existing homeowners brought a variety of constitutional challenges to the city’s denial of an
application to build a house on a small lot adjacent to their home lot. LaSalle Nat. Bank v. City of
Highland Park, 799 N.E.2d.781 (Ill. App. Ct 2003). The Court upheld the government, noting the
presumption of validity and the principle that “economic regulation” will be upheld if there is “any
reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis.” Id. at 799. Minimum lot sizes
are rational, the court reasoned, because they “prevent congestion and promote safety”. Id. at 797
(citing Reitman v. Village of River Forest, 9 Ill.2d 448, 453, 137 N.E.2d 801 (1956)). In a case from
Bedford, Massachusetts, outside Boston, a court upheld a challenge to a law requiring lots of at least
26,000 square feet, no part of which may occupy a wetland area. Zanghi v. Bd. of Appeals of Bedford,
807 N.E.2d 221 (2004). The court approved of the “meritorious goals” to “protect against flooding and
to maintain water quality.” Id. at 225.
167. Like most social and economic regulation, zoning laws typically are reviewed, in facial
challenges, through a rational basis test. See, e.g., Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 391
(1926)
(applying
a
“rational
relation”
test,
in
the
landmark
zoning
case).
Traditional rational basis review is a very deferential standard, under which a challenged law is to be
upheld “if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it . . . .” Lindsley v. Natural
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911). A recent example of a challenge to agriculturally oriented
lotting large arose in Lancaster County, Pa., where a court upheld a 25-acre minimum, despite the
argument of the landowner that the law effectively blocked population growth. Penn Street, L.P. v. East
Lampeter Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 84 A.3d 1114 (Comm. Ct. Pa. 2014). A more interesting recent
case, involving farm protection, arose in rural Umatilla County, in northeastern Oregon. Thompson v.
Land Conservation and Dev. Comm'n, 204 P.3d 808 (Or. Ct. App. 2009). There, the government
decreased a minimum lot size from 160 acres to only 40 acres, in order to facilitate vineyards and
wineries. Challengers asserted that this kind of agriculture harmed the traditional farming practice of
dry land wheat farming, noting that the state regulations required zoning that protected “existing”
farming enterprises. Id. at 829 (citing Ore. Admin. Reg. § 660-033-0100). The Court concluded that
“existing” included all pre-existing farm operations, not just the traditional dominant type of agriculture.
Id. at 815. This ruling acknowledged the need for zoning laws to change with a changing economy.
Had a developer sought to argue that Oregon’s population growth justified small house lots in Umatilla
County, however, the result might have been different.
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challenge,168 a landowner might argue that a specific application to its land
amounts to a “taking” that requires just compensation under the U.S. Constitution’s
Fifth Amendment.169 A regulation that “goes too far”—in the infamously
amorphous words of the Supreme Court, penned by Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., in 1922—may be considered a compensable taking.170 In Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, the Court offered factors to apply,
the most significant of which is whether the regulation has “interfered” with the
landowner’s “investment-backed expectations.”171 Accordingly, if a landowner
makes irretrievable investments in reasonable anticipation of being able to build a
certain density of homes, and the government then imposes a lower density
requirement that causes the landowner to lose a significant amount of the
investment, such a landowner might plausibly assert a fair claim for
compensation.172
The most interesting legal challenge in the new millennium arose in
Bedminster Township, Pennsylvania,173 a 31-square-mile suburb north of
Philadelphia. The township in 1996 enacted a complicated new ordinance,
ostensibly to preserve farmland.174 For tracts of land greater than ten acres, a
landowner was required to set aside at least half of farmable land for agricultural
purposes; the landowner could build a house lot of at least one acre on the
remainder of the tract, but could not build in wetland areas or floodplains.175 An
owner, whose plans to develop a subdivision were upset, challenged the change in
law.176 The state supreme court approved of the principles of both farmland
preservation and minimum lot sizes, rejecting an assertion that lotting size requires
168. For example, the zoning might not have been imposed in accordance with the authorization to
local governments under state law, or that the government did not conduct a required public hearing
before adopting a change.
169. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“nor shall private property be taken for public use without just
compensation”). Most state constitutions set forth rights similar to the Fifth Amendment’s takings
clause. See Robert Brauneis, The First Constitutional Tort: The Remedial Revolution in NineteenthCentury State Just Compensation Law, 52 VAND. L. REV. 57 (1999) (discussing state takings clauses).
170. Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
171. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
172. See Florida Rock Indus. v. U.S., 45 Fed. Cl. 21, 43 (1999) (finding a “taking” under the Penn
Central factors, including the upsetting of investment-backed expectations); see also Steven J. Eagle,
The Four-Factor Penn Central Regulatory Test, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 601 (2014) (scrutinizing the
factors and their applications, from a law and economics perspective). A recent example arose in Glenn
Heights, Texas, a rapidly growing little suburb south of Dallas. Sheffield Dev. Co., Inc. v. City of
Glenn Heights, 140 S.W.3d 660 (Tex. 2004). Although Texas is known for its relatively loose zoning
laws – and low housing prices – the city in 1997 tightened a minimum lot size requirement from 6,500
square feet to 12,000 square feet. Id. at 664-665. A developer that had previously notified the city of an
intention to subdivide 194 acres, sued, arguing that the tighter lotting large law was a compensable
taking, in large part because it upset the owner’s investment-backed expectations. Id. at 666. The
Supreme Court of Texas ruled for the city, holding that the change did not interfere with sunk costs,
calling the owner’s investment “speculative.” Id. at 678.
173. Bedminster Township, Pa., is not adjacent to Bedminster Township, N.J., which was the site of
a significant lotting large case in the 1950s. Perhaps the name “Bedminster” encourages laws to ensure
a “bedroom” character.
174. C & M Developers, Inc. v. Bedminster Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 820 A.2d 143, 146-47 (2002).
175. Id. at 148.
176. Id. at 148-50.
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an “extraordinary justification.”177 But the court also ruled that the combination of
restrictions—including the fact that the one-acre minimum size was chosen simply
because it was a “good number,” according to township officials—was unjustified
under state law.178 The court concluded that the township “is no longer attempting
to preserve agriculture, but rather, is improperly attempting to exclude people from
the area and, in so doing, is unreasonably restricting the property rights of the
landowner.”179 It was an uneasy form of reasoning to link a developer’s right to
build to the exclusionary effects on people who were not even parties to the
litigation. But Pennsylvania holds one of the nation’s strongest sets of laws
requiring governments to foster housing of various types, including apartments and
mobile homes.180 In any event, the impact of the intriguing Bedminster decision
has been diminished by subsequent cases. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
re-affirmed that the practice of lotting large is presumed to be valid.181
This survey of case law reveals that facial constitutional challenges to lotting
large are likely to result in dead ends. The Euclid deference to governments in
exercising their broad “police power”—other than in cases of explicit
discrimination against suspect classes—is consistent with American constitutional
law.182 Moreover, if a court accepts as valid justifications for the avoidance of
traffic congestion, the preservation of “open space,” or quiet “character,” then
almost any instance of lotting large will be defensible. Even a local politician who
supports lotting large because of a desire to exclude poor persons or people of
color, is likely to be savvy enough to mask this preference with more acceptable
and readily available public welfare arguments.
IV. A SIMPLE ECONOMIC MODEL OF LOTTING LARGE
Why is large lot zoning so ubiquitous as a method of land use regulation? To
answer this question, this Part develops a simple economic model for a typical
suburban jurisdiction. The suburb both faces demand for housing from prospective
migrants and contains a significant amount of “undeveloped” land—that is, land on
177. Id. at 151-53. The landowner relied on language in the Appeal of the Township of
Concord, 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970), to the effect that one-acre lots are sufficiently large for any
house, and that laws requiring larger lots need “extraordinary justification” because of their potential for
exclusion. Id. 766-70. This case did not recognize that large lot laws exist, not to give adequate room
for a house, but rather to dampen population growth. Indeed, a large lot can be built comfortably on
much less than one acre.
178. Id. at 157-58.
179. Id. at 158-59.
180. 53 Pa. Stat. § 10604(4), (5) (2015).
181. In re Petition of Dolington Land Group, 839 A.2d 1021 (Pa. 2003) (upholding a complex land
use ordinance and casting doubt on the viability of the Bedminster decision as significant precedent). A
lower Pennsylvania court upheld a 40-acre minimum, designed to preserve farms, and a one-acre lower
limit for single-family houses. McGonigle v. Lower Heidelberg Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 858 A.2d
663, 668-70 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004). Most recently, a lower court upheld a 25-acre minimum, imposed
to protect agriculture, despite the challenger’s reliance on the Bedminster case. Penn Street, L.P. v. East
Lampeter Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 84 A.3d 1114, 1142-44 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2014).
182. See, e.g., Minn. v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981) (observing deference given
to “economic” regulation); N.Y.C. Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) (serving as an example
of the deferential “rational basis” review in cases that do not implicate strict scrutiny based on race or
gender discrimination).
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which new single-family homes, apartments, or mobile homes, could be built.183
A. Current Residents’ Preference for Low Density
Let us assume that the county contains X number of acres of undeveloped
land. Law may regulate the maximum number of housing units that may be
constructed on this land.184 Without any legal restriction, the land could be built up
with large multi-family units. To use an extreme example, Stuyvesant Town/Peter
Cooper Village in lower Manhattan holds more than 11,000 apartments on 80
acres, or about 140 units per acre.185 Accordingly, the number of housing units on
the undeveloped area could rise to 100X or more. Suburban counties, even
populous ones, are typically much less dense, of course. For example, Westchester
County, New York, located north of the city, holds less than 1.4 units per acre.186
The most populous suburban county in the nation, Orange County, California, has
about 2.0 units per acre.187
Lot size zoning laws, by definition, restrain the number of housing units per
acre.188 The phenomenon of “large lot zoning” typically refers to laws that require
one acre or more per lot. Accordingly, it is more useful for this study to employ a
183. The distinction between developed and undeveloped suburbia is often significant under law.
For example, the famous “Mt. Laurel” doctrine, adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court in 1975,
imposed a duty of each “developing” locality to provide a “fair share” of low-cost housing. S.
Burlington County NAACP. v. Twp. of Mt. Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 715-23 (N.J. 1975) [hereinafter Mt.
Laurel I]. This doctrine represented the high-water mark of state constitutional efforts to prevent
localities from using zoning to exclude. The “developing” town limitation allowed many towns to argue
for a loophole; the distinction was removed in later opinions during the massive, multi-decade litigation.
Mt. Laurel II, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983).
184. It would be a mistake to assume that an in-demand jurisdiction will continually grow in
population. In cities, for example, all developable land may become occupied, thus making it physically
(or legally) impossible for the number of housing units to grow, unless the city allows for greater density
in already built-up areas. This could be achieved by changing zoning to allow for apartments on land
previously zoned for single-family houses, or by allowing tall apartments where small apartments have
stood. For example, the population of the square-mile City of London England, fell from more than
100,000 in 1851 to only about 7,000 today, not because it is economically depressed, but because its
land is now mostly occupied by offices, not housing. ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, CITY OF LONDON,
available at http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/346913/City-of-London.
185. Charles Bagli, Stuyvesant Town, Bastion of Affordable Housing, Is on Way Back to Auction,
N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/14/nyregion/stuyvesant-town-lenderprepares-to-foreclose-on-a-loan-for-the-complex.html. The “acre” (which encompasses 43,560 square
feet, or a square of about 208 feet on each side) is the unit used most often in land use and housing law.
Six hundred and forty acres make up a square mile, which is the unit most typically used for entire cities
and suburbs.
186. U.S. Bureau of the Census, State and County Quick Facts: Westchester County, N.Y.,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/36/36119.html. Similarly, the large and affluent Cobb County,
Georgia, north of Atlanta, holds about 1.3 units per acre. U.S. Bureau of the Census, State and County
Quick Facts; Cobb County, N.Y., http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/13/13067.html.
187. U.S, Bureau of the Census, State and County Quick Facts: Orange County, Cal.,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06/06059.html.
188. The numbers in this paragraph ignore small complications of, for example, whether streets are
included in the calculations of units per acre. Moreover, most suburban jurisdictions require that new
housing developments include significant acreage of “open space” – woods, fields, ponds, etc. – and
other acreage not part of the housing units. These requirements decrease further the number of
allowable units per acre.
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term that refers to “acres per lot,” rather than “lots per acre.” Let us define N as the
minimum number of acres per lot permissible under the law. N is the “minimum
lot size.”189 The number N runs counter to density; a high N allows fewer houses
in a given area than does a low N. Accordingly, the fraction A/N represents the
maximum number of houses that is permissible in an area encompassed by an
acreage expressed by A. If A = 100, a hypothetical zoning law that assigns N = 2,
ensures a maximum of 50 houses in the area. When N = 1 in the same area, 100
houses are allowed. If N = 20, only five houses are permissible.190
As explained in Part III, American land use law typically permits wide
discretion in assigning N (the minimum lot size). Many localities, especially “in
demand” suburbs, have reasons to impose a high N. Local governments are
responsive exclusively to their current residents.191 They are not responsible for
considering the interests of prospective migrants, persons in other areas of the state,
or any other notion of public welfare beyond its own borders.192 As noted above,
local governments often act to avoid high density, thus offering an “amenity” to
current residents.193 One motivation is to preserve the relative quiet and
“character” of a community.194 As Schoenbrod reasoned in 1969: “Fewer new
neighbors mean less noise, less traffic, and more open space”—in the sense of
more lawns and fewer buildings, and fewer automobiles on the local streets.195
Fewer cars mean somewhat cleaner air, while fewer people means less garbage and
fewer people crowding local parks and trails.
Next, restraining the number of new houses legally constrains supply in the
jurisdiction, thus increasing the value of the existing homes of the current
189. For the example of four units per acre, N = 1/4. For a minimum of two acres per lot, N = 2.
190. Zoning law may allow more than one unit per acre, of course. When one acre lawfully holds
five units, as with a neighborhood of small single-family houses, N= 1/5. With an area zoned for
multifamily housing (that is, apartments or condominiums), one acre might lawfully hold 30 units; here,
N=1/30.
191. Schoenbrod, supra note 38, at 1420 (“Present law authorizes suburbs to zone, and homeowners
alone control the suburb’s decisions.”). In the landmark case, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365 (1926), the Supreme Court reasoned:
But the village, though physically a suburb of Cleveland, is politically
a separate municipality, with powers of its own and authority to govern itself as it sees fit,
within the limits of the organic law of its creation and the state and federal Constitutions.
Its governing authorities, presumably representing a majority of its inhabitants and
voicing their will, have determined, not that industrial development shall cease at its
boundaries, but that the course of such development shall proceed within definitely fixed
lines.
Id. at 389; see also FISCHEL, supra note 36, at 4 (arguing that “homevoters” push local governments to
regulate in a manner that maximizes the value of their homes).
192. See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 389 (observing that a suburb need respond only to its own wishes).
193. See Gottlieb et. al., supra note 48, at 5; William T. Bogart, What Big Teeth You Have!
Identifying the motivations for exclusionary zoning, 30 URB. STUD. 1669 (1993) (identifying various
motivations, including psychological reasons).
194. See, e.g., Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956, 959-61(1st Cir. 1972)
(lotting large to preserve the rural “character” of the town); Elbert v. Vill. of N. Hills, 28 N.Y.S.2d 317,
319 (1941) (citing the desire for preserving “quietude and rural character”).
195. Schoenbrod, supra note 38, at 1420; see also Soc’y of Plan. Officials, Minimum requirements
for Lot and Building Size, AM. PLAN. ASS’N, https://www.planning.org/pas/at60/report37.htm (1952)
(observing that lotting large “may eliminate congestion”).
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residents.196 Prospective homebuyers have fewer choices than they would under a
free market and will bid up the prices of the relatively scarce houses in existence.197
In addition, the inflated prices for the relatively scarce existing houses make it
more difficult for persons of modest incomes to migrate to the area. This appeals
to “snob zoning”198 and those who wish to exclude racial minority households, who
tend to have lower incomes.199 Moreover, to the extent that new housing increases
the costs of public infrastructure, such as roads, sewers, and schools, current
residents have an incentive to oppose density in order to avoid higher taxes.200
These factors are sometimes characterized by the catchall acronym NIMBY,
meaning “not in my backyard.”201 Although this acronym is useful, it can seem
overly glib, thus obscuring the significance of the phenomenon by which a
locality’s residents seek to restrain population density in their jurisdiction.
B. Lotting Large as the Preferred Tool
Law offers existing residents a variety of tools to restrain population density.
Let us define D as the population density of a city, town, or county. D may be
limited by a number of factors. We can express D as a function of various factors
as follows: D = f ( a, b, c, d, e . . .). This section identifies five factors as potential
policy choices to restrain density. They are: (a) a jurisdictional population
limitation; (b) a cap on new housing; (c) geographic prohibitions on new housing;
and (d) a household population limit; in addition to (e) large lot zoning. As
explained herein, lotting large is the option that is most likely to be effective in
checking population density, and most likely to withstand a legal challenge.
1. Jurisdictional Population Limitations.
Perhaps the most straightforward option to control density would be to impose

196. See Ward, Schuetz, & Glaeser, supra note 43, at 4-5 (noting that large lot zoning laws drive up
prices in both the jurisdiction in which they are adopted, and neighboring ones that feel added pressure
from home buyers who are stymied from buying in the first area).
197. See Schoenbrod, supra note 38, at 1421 (“The market value of each homebuyer’s property will
rise as the lot size minimum is increased.”).
198. One of the first instances of the usage of this common characterization was Peter J. Adang, Snob
Zoning – A Look at the Economic and Social Impact of Low Density Zoning, 15 SYRACUSE L. REV. 507
(1963-1964).
199. The most famous spotlight on the exclusionary effects of restrictive zoning laws on people of
color and poor people was the famous decades-long litigation involving Mt. Laurel, N.J. Here, the New
Jersey Supreme Court in 1975 declared that black, Hispanic, and poor persons were effectively “barred”
from the suburb outside Philadelphia because of the town’s large lot zoning requirements. Mt. Laurel I,
336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975); see also Matthew Resseger, The Impact of Land Use Regulation on Racial
Segregation: Evidence from Massachusetts Zoning Borders 33 (2013) (unpublished job market paper)
(available at http://scholar.harvard.edu/resseger/jmp) (concluding that minimum lot sizes do restrain the
number of black and Hispanic families).
200. See, e.g., Mt. Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 723 (referring to the desire to avoid higher taxes necessitated
by new housing, especially for schools); DAVID L. CALLIES, ROBERT H. FREILICH & THOMAS E.
ROBERTS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND USE 199-200 (5th ed. 2008) (developing the argument that
existing residents “subsidize” newcomers through taxes that pay for infrastructure).
201. See, e.g., Michael B. Gerrard, The Victims of NIMBY, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 495 (1994)
(identifying various groups that suffer when restraints are imposed).
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a firm limit on population. While such a law theoretically could be justified under
the expansive interpretation of a government’s police power,202 it likely would run
afoul of other constitutional norms. Any attempt to control births would probably
violate the right to privacy, including the right to reproduce.203 It is unlikely that an
American government would attempt a step in the direction of China’s infamous
one-child policy.204 Likewise, a blanket prohibition against new migrants—
perhaps ameliorated by a waiting list that would be activated upon the death of an
existing resident—probably would violate the right to travel.205 The Supreme
Court struck down, as violating the commerce power, California’s attempt in the
1930s to limit the migration of “Okies” and other poor migrants fleeing the “Dust
Bowl” of the central United States.206
2. Caps on New Housing.
A more palatable method of imposing a permanent restraint on density would
be to cap the number of housing units, as opposed to people. Yet again, this step
faces obstacles. Probably the most notable example was taken by Boca Raton,
Florida, a wealthy suburb north of Miami, in the 1970s.207 A referendum approved
by city voters capped the maximum number of housing units at 40,000 and required
the city government to deny any building permit that would push the total over the
cap. The government implemented this policy with a variety of restraints,

202. The police power encompasses any law that would further the health, safety, or general
“welfare” of the public. See, e.g., Town of Dillon v. Yacht Club Condo. Home Owners Ass’n, 325 P.3d
1032, 1044 (Colo. 2014); Farley v. Graney, 119 S.E.2d 833, 854 (W. Va. 1960). The United Kingdom,
for example, has been engaged in a debate whether it should attempt to place some sort of cap on its
population, which as of 2015 was about 63 million; some argue for a cap of about 70 million. Mark
Easton, What is the UK’s optimum population?, BBC NEWS, July 16, 2012,
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-18854762. A strict limitation on population growth might well foster the
general welfare of the current residents, who would not have to face the prospect of increased road
traffic or the costs of greater infrastructure.
203. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (“Our law affords
constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, [and] child rearing . . . These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973)
(establishing a right not to reproduce through aborting a pregnancy).
BRITANNICA,
204. See
Kenneth
Pletcher,
One-Child
Policy,
ENCYCLOPEDIA
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1710568/one-child-policy (last visited Nov. 5, 2015).
China announced in 2015 an end to the controversial policy. Chris Buckley, China Ends One-Child
Policy, Allowing Families Two Children, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/10/30/world/asia/china-end-one-child-policy.html?_r=0.
205. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338 (1972) (discussing the development of the “right to
travel”); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (vindicating the right to travel, interpreting the right
to equal protection); Crandall v. Nev., 73 U.S. 35 (1868) (first statement of the right to travel).
206. Edwards v. Cal., 314 U.S. 160, 168 (1941). For a brief discussion of the history leading up to
Edwards, see Constitutional Rights Foundation, Dust Bowl Exodus: How Drought and the Depression
Took Their Toll (2005), http://www.crf-usa.org/bill-of-rights-in-action/bria-21-3-a-dust-bowl-exodushow-drought-and-the-depression-took-their-toll.html. There is little doubt that some 21st century
residents of California or Colorado lament the inability to bar out-of-state migrants.
207. City of Boca Raton v. Boca Villas Corp., 371 So.2d 154, 155 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
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including tougher large lot laws.208 But a state appellate court struck down the cap,
concluding that there was little or no evidence that infrastructure, schools, or other
city services could not handle further population growth.209 In doing so, the court
sub silentio reversed the usual presumption in favor of the validity of zoning laws
and placed the burden on the city government to justify it, which the government
apparently did not do vigorously.210
More popular than a cap on the number of housing units is a rationing of new
housing. The most famous early example was in Ramapo, New York, in the late
1960s. The suburb adopted a quota system for new housing permits, under which
proposed units received points for their proximity to existing infrastructure, such as
schools, roads, and sewer roads.211 The New York courts approved the plan, in part
through a finding that the town was committed to building new infrastructure to
allow for population growth.212 A similar approach was taken by Livermore,
California, near the San Francisco Bay area.213 Although the Supreme Court of
California upheld a moratorium on new housing until the city improved its
infrastructure, the plan withstood a withering dissent from Justice Mosk, who wrote
that Livermore’s action “invokes an elitist concept to construct a mythical moat
around its perimeter, not for the benefit of mankind but to exclude all but its
fortunate current residents.”214
A service-based moratorium may be fiscally sound, but it provides no longterm guarantee of checking density. Indeed, Livermore’s population has more than
doubled since its temporary stop-growth plan.215 A firmer means of controlling
population is to impose an annual quota on new housing units. This approach was
once adopted by Petaluma, California.216 Although the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit warned that “municipalities today are neither isolated nor wholly
independent from neighboring municipalities and that, consequently, unilateral land
use decisions by one local entity affect the needs and resources of an entire region,”

208. Id.
209. Id. at 155-57.
210. Id. at 156-60. For the rule that local laws adopted pursuant to the police power are presumed to
be valid, see, e.g., Vill. of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926) (zoning);
Unverferth v. City of Florissant, 419 S.W.3d 76, 95 (Mo. Ct .App. 2013) (traffic laws). Had Boca Raton
defended the voter-approved cap more vigorously, perhaps with time-tested arguments that it sought to
restrain auto traffic and provide for open space and a suburban character, the analysis might have been
different.
211. Golden v. Planning Bd. of Town of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 365-71 (1972).
212. Id. at 382.
213. Associated Home Builders etc., Inc. v. City of Livermore, 557 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1976). The city
was once a small agricultural center, but by the 1970s was faced with a wave of population demand
from people seeking reasonably priced houses in pleasant neighborhoods within driving distance of San
Francisco Bay.
214. Id. at 492 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
215. Compare Bay Area Census, City of Livermore 1970 Census, http://www.bayareacensus.ca.gov/
cities/Livermore70.htm (last visited Dec. 15, 2015), with Bay Area Census, City of Livermore 2010
Census, http://www.bayareacensus.ca.gov/cities/Livermore.htm (last visited Dec. 15, 2015).
216. Constr. Indus. Ass'n of Sonoma Cnty. v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975). Once
a “small town,” the city was absorbed into the San Francisco Bay metro area. Id. at 900. The local
government imposed a cap of only 500 housing permits per year, which was considerably smaller than
the number granted just before the new law. Id. at 900-02.
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it upheld Petaluma’s quota.217 Using language that could have been written in the
1920s, the court concluded: “[T]he concept of the public welfare is sufficiently
broad to uphold Petaluma's desire to preserve its small town character, its open
spaces and low density of population, and to grow at an orderly and deliberate
pace.”218 But this slow-growth technique still allows for a perpetual, creeping
population increase; Petaluma now holds more than twice as many persons as it did
when the quota law was adopted.219
3. Geographic Prohibitions of New Housing.
Another technique would be to ban entirely new construction in certain areas
or zones. But this potentially powerful tool for restricting density runs afoul of the
sole reference in the U.S. Constitution to “property”—the Fifth Amendment right
against the government’s uncompensated “taking” of property.220 The most notable
example of a blanket geographic ban on new housing was a 1988 South Carolina
law that prohibited any new construction within a certain distance of the Atlantic
shoreline.221 A real estate developer named David Lucas, who had spent nearly a
million dollars to buy two empty beachfront lots in the midst of a developed coastal
community, was in effect prevented from building anything.222 This ostensibly
dramatic consequence compelled the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice
Antonin Scalia, to establish a fairly clear principle of regulatory takings law: when
a regulation removes “all economically beneficial uses” of the land, the
government has, in effect, “taken” the land and must provide just compensation.223
The state agency ended up paying the landowner and then selling the land.224 The
“total taking” principle set forth in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council stands
as a formidable roadblock to regulations on density.225 The principle encourages
governments to avoid, at all costs, any regulation that might be characterized as
“total” with regard to a landowner. By contrast, a regulation that allows a
landowner some economically beneficial use of the land—even if the income is
only a small fraction of what might accrue if it were unregulated—does not trigger

217. Id. at 908.
218. Id. at 908-09. The Court was swayed in part by a lack of evidence that the quotas were designed
to limit minority persons, thus eliminating a potential claim of unconstitutional discrimination. Id. at
908.
219. See BAY AREA CENSUS, City of Petaluma, 1970 -1990, http://www.bayareacensus.ca.gov/
cities/Petaluma70.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2015); BAY AREA CENSUS, City of Petaluma, 2000-2010,
http://www.bayareacensus.ca.gov/cities/Petaluma.htm (last visited (Oct. 1, 2015).
220. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
221. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1007-09 (1992) (discussing South Carolina’s
Beachfront Management Act, S.C. Code Ann. § 48–39–250 (Supp.1990)).
222. Id. at 1008.
223. Id. at 1019. The only circumstance in which the government may avoid liability is when the
government is regulating something that “inheres” in the landowner’s title to begin with, such as the
traditional principle that one may not use one's land to create a nuisance. Id. at 1028.
224. GIDEON KANNER, NOT WITH A BANG, BUT A GIGGLE: THE SETTLEMENT OF THE LUCAS CASE
ch. 15 (David L. Callies ed. 1996).
225. Commentators summarize the holding in Lucas as the “total taking” principle. See, e.g., John J.
Delaney, What Does It Take to Take? A Post-Dolan Look at the Evolution of Regulatory Takings
Jurisprudence in the Supreme Court, 27 URB. LAW. 55, 64 (1995) (referring to “total taking”).
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Lucas compensation.226 Rather, such regulations are analyzed under the much
more forgiving—for the government—Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New
York City test.227
4. Household Population Limitations.
Another technique to slow population density would be to restrict the number
of persons who may live in a household. But this, by itself, would not limit new
housing construction. And it also would encounter some of the same constitutional
dilemmas that complicate population caps. Although they are enforced fitfully,
many jurisdictions ostensibly regulate the “overcrowding” of houses and
apartments.228 But any law that purports to restrict related persons from living
together would be on constitutional thin-ice. The most famous example was Moore
v. City of East Cleveland, in which the U.S. Supreme Court struck down, through
substantive due process, an ordinance that prevented a grandmother and two
grandchildren from living together in a single house.229 Accordingly, while
governments may permissibly zone out group houses and other unwanted living
arrangements,230 restrictions on household composition are unlikely to be very
effective at limiting density.231
226. In Euclid, the landowner asserted that the zoning law decreased the value of its property by
significantly more than 50 percent. 272 U.S. at 384. An even more dramatic example was Hadacheck
v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915), in which the landowner received no relief, even after an assertion that
the value of its land fell by more than 80 percent because of the land use law. Id. at 405.
227. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). The Penn Central decision set forth factors for a court to consider in a
non-total regulatory takings claim, the most important of which is whether the regulation upset
“significant investment-backed expectations.” Id. at 124. An extensive recent survey concluded that
Penn Central claims that rely solely on financial loss are a “difficult sell.” Robert Meltz, Takings Law
Today: A Primer for the Perplexed, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 307, 371 (2007).
228. For a critical analysis of such laws, and the controversy that arose in Manassas and Prince
William County, Va., where occupancy limits were enforced most often against Latino migrants to the
suburban areas in the years 2005-2008, see PAUL BOUDREAUX, THE HOUSING BIAS 11-60 (2011).
229. 431 U.S. 494, 497 (1977). The court reasoned that “[t]he tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and
especially grandparents sharing a household along with parents and children has roots equally venerable
and equally deserving of constitutional recognition.” Id. at 504.
230. See Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (upholding an affluent suburb’s ban on
group houses of unrelated people, in an enforcement action against a group of college students who had
rented a house).
231. A related concept would be to restrict the maximum size of a house. Indeed, “area” limits on
the bulk of buildings are ubiquitous in zoning law. See, e.g., JULIAN CONRAD JURGENSMEYER &
THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW 83, at 4:14 (3d ed.
2013) (discussing laws limiting floor-area ratio). But with the average household in the United States
falling to 2.5 persons, and most households holding only one or two persons, see sources cited supra
notes 121-125 and accompanying text, such restrictions are unlikely to be successful in limiting new
construction. An interesting side note concerns laws that impose minimum sizes on houses and
apartments. One notable early case struck down a law imposing minimum sizes and minimum costs,
reasoning that “[n]o person under the zoning power can legally be deprived of his right to build a house
on his land merely because the cost of that house is less than the cost of his neighbor’s house.”
Lionshead Lake Inc. v. Wayne Twp., 80 A.2d 650, 653 (1951). A thoughtful report of the American
Planning Association in 1952 gave almost as much attention to minimum house size laws as to
minimum lot size laws. AM. PLANNING ASS'N, supra note 195, at 6-13. It noted the exclusionary effect
of such laws against households with lower incomes, referring to the problem of “snob” zoning. Id. at
10-12. In any event, house size laws are less popular today than lot size laws, perhaps because of the
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5. Large Lot Zoning.
In contrast to the other policy options, large lot zoning offers a relatively clear
path for local governments to control both population and housing density. Unlike
population caps, it is not susceptible to constitutional claims of the right to
reproduce or travel. Unlike moratoria, it may be permanent. Unlike quotas or
household composition limitations, it may guarantee a long-term restriction on the
population density. And unlike geographical bans on new housing, lotting large
avoids the ominous prospect—to government—of a Lucas taking.
The centrality of Lucas in this simple model is worth exploring in further
depth. The “total taking” doctrine from Lucas triggers compensation whenever a
government prevents an owner from building anything on its lot, regardless of its
size.232 By contrast, a regulation that allows some valuable use of the land does not
implicate Lucas and is unlikely to trigger compensation, even if the regulation is
extensive, covers a large tract of land, and imposes a significant loss of potential
revenue to the landowner. 233 For example, imagine that a government approved
the subdivision of a large parcel of land into 1000 small house lots, which are sold
to a variety of buyers, including real estate speculators who decide to wait before
building. Later, the government began to worry about the effect of so many new
houses on the erosion of a local river and auto traffic on a small rural road. If the
government attempted to change its land use laws, to prevent even a small share of
the undeveloped house lots from being built, it would make itself vulnerable to
Lucas takings claims by each restrained landowner. By contrast, if the government
recognized concerns over dense development before the large parcel were
subdivided, it could impose large lot zoning that allowed for only a handful of lots
on the big parcel. Because the large landowner in this instance would be able to
make some money from the big parcel, the large lot law would be invulnerable to a
Lucas claim. This would be true even though the lotting large regulation might
require the large parcel owner to build fewer houses and make less money than it
could in the example of the post-subdivision regulation of a few small lots.
When the law of takings and other constitutional rights is combined with the
deference that courts have granted to lotting large, it is safe to reach this
conclusion: Large lot zoning is the most attractive and most defensible method for
a local government, spurred by its existing homeowners, to use law to avoid density
and to slow population growth. The widespread popularity of the phenomenon of
lotting large, discussed in Part II, helps confirm the validity of this simple
economic model.
The incentive for each suburb to lot large creates a policy conundrum,
however, for the general welfare of the metropolitan area. As each suburb adopts
large lot zoning and restrains new construction, the prices for housing of all types

relative ease of justifying the lot laws and the effectiveness of lot laws in ensuring low population
density, which might be more important to current residents than ensuring the wealth of new migrants.
232. The holding in Lucas included no restriction as to the size or value of the lot. 505 U.S. at 1019.
233. In Lucas, the Court noted the oddness of the principle by which a total taking automatically
triggers compensation, but a 90 percent taking does not necessarily result in any compensation. 505
U.S. at 1016 n.7. For anything less than a total taking, courts should apply the Penn Central factors.
438 U.S. at 124.
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rise in all jurisdictions across the area. Households with modest incomes find it
more difficult to afford decent housing and resort to steps such as long commutes
to distant locales—thus exacerbating the metro’s suburban sprawl—and agreeing to
sizeable mortgage loan commitments that they may not be able to repay, as so
many Americans did in the “housing boom” years of the new millennium.234
A solution for a metropolitan area would be to allow for smaller lots and more
density, in closer-in suburbs. But each individual jurisdiction has an incentive to
eschew such a choice. This is a prime example of a “prisoners’ dilemma,” in
which the best solution for a group is stymied by the preferences of individuals to
follow their own self-interest, even though the eventual result is worse for each
individual in the group.235 No single individual can avoid the dilemma; the
participants are trapped, even if they recognize its existence.236 One solution to the
dilemma is for all of those in the group to co-operate and work together to achieve
the optimal solution.237 To achieve this, the members must agree that the
cooperative solution would be superior to the self-centered choices.238 In the case
of large lot zoning, individual suburbs are unlikely to abandon their parochial
interests. Alternatively, an outside party might force the participants to follow a
united path that leads to the betterment of the group, even if the parties do so
unwillingly. In the case of land use, law should look to this latter policy option:
using state law to compel local governments to abandon, or at least moderate, their
minimum lot size laws.
V. CRACKING LARGE LOT ZONING
Large lot zoning is an example of the contentious topic of “exclusionary
zoning”—laws that prevent people from living in a community, whether or not by
design.239 Large lot zoning is perhaps the most significant, and underappreciated,
234. See Adam J. Levin & Susan M. Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble, 100 GEO. L. J. 1177,
1212-13 (2012) (discussing the evidence that restraints on supply raises housing costs in certain areas,
which encourages risky mortgages). For a report asserting that the housing bubble was spurred largely
by fraud about household income, on behalf of both borrowers and lenders who quickly sold the loans to
gullible investors, see Atif R. Mian & Amir Sufi, Fraudulent Income Overstatement on Mortgage
Applications during the Credit Expansion of 2002 to 2005 (working paper 2015),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2561366; Binyamin Appelbaum, How Mortgage
Fraud Made the Financial Crisis Worse, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/02/13/upshot/how-mortgage-fraud-made-the-financial-crisis-worse.html.
235. See Avinash Dixit and Barry Nalebuff, Prisoners’ Dilemma, THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
ECONOMICS, http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/PrisonersDilemma.html (explaining the game and its
implications.)
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. The literature on exclusionary zoning is vast and takes on many angles and dimensions.
Perhaps the leading economic commentator has been Professor Fischel. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE
ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAWS: A PROPERTY RIGHTS APPROACH TO AMERICAN LAND USE CONTROLS
(1985); William A. Fischel, An Economic History of Zoning and a Cure for its Exclusionary Effects, 41
URB. STUD. 317 (2004). For a good discussion of the topic from the planning perspective, see
JONATHAN LEVINE, ZONED OUT: REGULATION, MARKETS, AND CHOICES IN TRANSPORTATION AND
METROPOLITAN LAND USE (2005) (analyzing the topic from a variety of angles, including
transportation). For my contribution, which included a number of vignettes, see PAUL BOUDREAUX,
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manifestation of the phenomenon. Because exclusionary zoning remains a
powerful and immoveable force in American law—90 years after the trial judge in
the landmark Euclid case recognized that zoning tended to “classify the population
and segregate them according to their income or situation in life”240—this article
cannot offer a silver bullet. In the current climate of American law and politics, the
hopes for overcoming large lot zoning are slim. This observation may be
disappointing both for the reader and for the millions of Americans who are
adversely affected by lotting large.
But this article can point the way to legal approaches that are more likely than
others to hold some chance of success. Three elements are essential. First, the
effort must recognize that local governments, spurred by their current residents,
will resist mightily any attempt to force housing density upon them. The most
infamous example of this obstacle was the decades-long litigation that arose from
Mt. Laurel, New Jersey.241 The laws of this suburb, which included both large lot
zoning and a complete prohibition against apartments,242 were challenged as
violating the New Jersey Constitution's duty of governments to act for the welfare
of the public.243 The state supreme court famously held that each jurisdiction must
provide realistic “opportunities” for offering a “fair share” of the region’s low-cost
housing needs.244 Eight years later, however, the controversy returned to the court,
which noted that its order had “threaten[ed] to become infamous,” because of local
opposition.245 With a massive and detailed order, the court clarified its earlier
decree and imposed a series of tasks,246 including the remarkable step of assigning
only specific judges to oversee compliance.247 After local governments resisted
mightily,248 mayors threatened to go to jail rather than comply, the New Jersey
legislature softened the duties through a statute and a regulatory agency that would
certify local government plans.249 For decades, cities and towns have struggled
with the complex and controversial rules, which are constantly being challenged
and litigated. The story is well told in Professor Charles Haar’s Suburbs Under

THE HOUSING BIAS (2011). For a sampling of other significant legal contributions, see Christopher
Serkin & Leslie Wellington, Putting Exclusionary Zoning in Its Place: Affordable Housing and
Geographic Scale, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1667 (2013) (showing that the practice is not limited solely
to growing suburbs); Henry A. Span, How the Courts Should Fight Exclusionary Zoning, 32 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1 (2001) (discussing judicial approaches); Harold A. McDougall, From Litigation to
Legislation in Exclusionary Zoning Law, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 623 (1987) (discussing
development in the aftermath of the Mt. Laurel litigation).
240. Ambler Realty Co. v. Vill. of Euclid, Ohio, 297 F. 307, 316 (N.D. Ohio 1924), rev’d, 272 U.S.
365 (1926).
241. S. Burlington Cnty. N.A.A.C.P. v. Mount Laurel Twp., 456 A.2d 390 (1983) (setting forth a
requirement of affirmative steps to ensure the availability of low-cost housing); S. Burlington County
N.A.A.C.P. v. Mount Laurel Twp., 336 A.2d 713, 724-25 (N.J. 1975) (imposing a “fair share” duty).
242. 336 A.2d at 718-23.
243. Id. at 725-29 (interpreting the requirements of the New Jersey Constitution).
244. Id. at 724-25.
245. Mt. Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 410.
246. Id. at 418-59.
247. Id. at 459 (referring to the assignment of certain judges to Mt. Laurel litigation).
248. HAAR, supra note 36, at 30-36 (discussing the resistance to the Mt, Laurel doctrine).
249. New Jersey Fair Housing Act, N.J. Rev. Stat. §§ 52:27D-301 to 52:27D-309.9 (2015).
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In the new millennium, Republican Governor Chris Christie’s
Siege.250
administration attempted to disband the agency and delayed implementation of
some court orders; the exasperating story was still bubbling in the year 2015.251
The prospect of stricter judicial review of large lot zoning is likely to face
similar obstacles. Zoning is simply too complex and too site-specific for generalinterest judges to be able to scrutinize. It is not feasible for a court to judge the
wisdom of steps taken by a local government to zone, for example, a particular area
with a one-acre minimum, a quarter-acre minimum, or for multi-unit apartments.
One idea is to reverse the presumption of validity and require governments to
convince a court why an “exclusionary” zoning technique is justified.252 But this is
bound to be a dead end. All zoning is, by definition, exclusionary, in that it legally
prevents something from being built.253 It is unworkable to expect a judge to
decide the multifaceted issues of, for example, whether two-acre minimum zoning,
or a large apartment block, is appropriate for an area just off a freeway but near a
stream that is home to an imperiled species of fish, and to repeat this analysis for
dozens of sites in each jurisdiction. The inability of the court system to rule on the
wisdom of each and every detail of statutes and regulations is one reason why
courts defer to legislative and regulatory judgments, with or without a formal
doctrine telling them to do so.254 The lesson from New Jersey’s tale of judicial
remedies is that law must expect local governments to resist and take advantage of
any opportunity to use their discretion and avoid real compliance. The only
approach that might succeed is for state (or metropolitan) governments to restrain
local government’s desire and power to lot large.255
250. See generally HAAR, supra note 36 (discussing a history of the politics and law surrounding the
Mt. Laurel doctrine).
251. Samantha Marcus, N.J. Supreme Court losing patience with Christie administration's affordable
housing inaction, NJ.COM, Mar. 10, 2015, http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2015/01/
nj_supreme_court_losing_patience_with_christie_administrations_affordable_housing_inaction.html;
Brent Johnson, N.J. affordable housing council fails to adopt Christie's new rules despite Supreme
Court deadline, NJ.COM, Oct 25, 2014, http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/10/
nj_affordable_housing_council_fails_to_adopt_new_rules_despite_supreme_court_deadline.html#incart
_m-rpt-2.
252. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Lehmann, Reversing Judicial Deference Toward Exclusionary Zoning: A
Suggested Approach, 12 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & CMTY. DEV. L. 229 (2003) (arguing for a reversal
of the presumption for large lot zoning greater than one acre when there is proof of “exclusionary
intent”).
253. A pithy summary is: “[z]oning, thy name is exclusion.” Donald Hagman, Taking care of One’s
Own Through Inclusionary Zoning: Bootstrapping Low- and Moderate-Income Housing by Local
Government, 5 URB. L. & POL’Y 169 (1082). The paraphrase is to WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET,
act 1, sc. 2 (“Frailty, thy name is woman!”).
254. See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)
[hereinafter Chevron] (federal courts must defer to reasonable interpretations of regulations by federal
agencies tasked with administering them); Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978) (In
response to an invitation to deny an injunction against the government, despite a clear violation of the
endangered species law, stating “But is that our function? We have no expert knowledge on the subject
of endangered species, much less do we have a mandate from the people to strike a balance of
equities.”).
255. The most notable examples of a higher government imposing direct orders on functions that
traditionally have been under local control were the federal orders for local governments to desegregate
their schools by race. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1971)
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Second, a reasonable legal approach to lotting large must be reconciled with
the constitutional right to compensation for a regulation that imposes a Lucas-type
“total taking.” As explained in Part IV, lotting large is so appealing to local
governments because, compared to other options, it is foolproof. When justified by
court-approved “welfare” interests such as avoiding congestion or placing added
burdens schools and sewers—and what new housing does not do so?—large lot
zoning imposes simple and permanent restraints on housing construction, over
almost any area that a government wishes to limit. Lotting large—which regulates
the size of lots but still ensures that each lot may contain one buildable house—
avoids the likelihood of a successful takings claim. Advocates of “smart growth"
and “new urbanism” may tout the benefits of dense, clustered development instead
of sprawling suburbs,256 but a law that prevents an owner of a parcel from building
something valuable on it will likely generate a Lucas claim. Any reasonable idea
for reform must take into account the powerful impetus that takings law gives to
large lot zoning.
Third, a reform should directly combat the principal harms of lotting large:
suburban sprawl and higher housing costs. With these concerns in mind, many
initiatives of “inclusionary zoning” for low-cost housing are likely be
insufficient.257 Government may create affordable housing by building units itself
or through financial incentives to developers.258 The most common inclusionary
zoning practice is a “set aside,” under which new housing developments must
include some low-cost housing units, as a condition to the government's approval to
subdivide and build.259 An advantage of a set-aside is that it necessitates no out-ofpocket expenditures by a cash-strapped local government and takes advantage of
the private profit motivation to build low-cost housing; if a developer does not
agree to build the inexpensive units, it cannot construct the bigger, profitgenerating houses.260 But inclusionary techniques do little to discourage localities
from imposing minimum lot sizes. Indeed, a set-aside requirement might in some
instances increase the local political pressure for lotting large in undeveloped parts
(ordering school busing to achieve desegregation); Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 495
(1954) (holding that racial segregation was unconstitutional).
256. See, e.g., Michael Lewyn, New Urbanist Zoning for Dummies, 58 ALA. L. REV. 257 (2006)
(setting forth principles of new urbanism, which favors dense, mixed-use construction); SMART
GROWTH AM., What is “smart growth?” http://www.smartgrowthamerica.org/what-is-smart-growth
(2015) (discussing smart growth ideas).
257. See, e.g., Andrew G. Dietderich, An Egalitarian’s Market: The Economics of Inclusionary
Zoning Reclaimed, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 23 (1996) (arguing that inclusionary zoning laws will
increase the affordability of housing across income levels); GERRIT KNAAP, STUART MECK, TERRY
MOORE & ROBERT PARKER, AM. PLAN. ASS’N, ZONING AS A BARRIER TO MULTIFAMILY HOUSING
DEVELOPMENT (2007), http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/zoning_MultifmlyDev.pdf; Update On
Inclusionary Zoning, NAT’L ASS’N OF HOME BUILDERS (May 2011), http://www.nahb.org/
en/research/~/media/7F9C87D9172E4DC68A144B9C646A43A8.ashx / (discussing "best practices” for
inclusionary zoning).
258. See Mt. Laurel II, 456 A.2d 390, 442-51 (1983) (discussing a variety of “affirmative measures”
to provide low-cost housing, including subsidies, incentives, and set-asides).
259. See. e.g., Dietderich, supra note 257 at 77-95 (discussing the economics of “set asides”).
260. See Nicholas Benson, A Tale of Two Cities: Examining the Success of Inclusionary Zoning
Ordinances in Montgomery County, Maryland and Boulder, Colorado, 13 J. GENDER RACE & JUST.
753, 759-64 (2010) (analyzing attributes of a successful mandatory set-aside program).
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of the jurisdiction, thus exacerbating sprawl.261 Moreover, by imposing costs on
housing developers—some set-aside housing may create a monetary loss to the
developer—inclusionary zoning may push up the costs of market-rate housing and
discourage investment in new housing developments that are needed for a growing
nation.262
Toward a Path Forward. What would a plausible legal reform look like? It
certainly would have to be accomplished at the state or national level. Absent a
state law banning the practice of lotting large, a reform would have to take small
steps. Taking a cue from Mt. Laurel, a reform would impose upon local
governments a mandatory obligation, with little wiggle room for delay or
obfuscation. And taking a lesson from Lucas, an effective solution would
recognize that local governments are loathe to adopt land use restrictions that might
trigger “total takings” claims.
There are many potential approaches for state laws to curb large lot zoning, in
that they are easy to conjure up. But it is difficult to imagine how they could be
politically appealing in a nation that has so long been dedicated to the Euclid ideal
of local control and its lodestar of the welfare of current residents. Schoenbrod
suggested in 1969 that a state could impose a presumptive ceiling on large lot
size—perhaps one acre—and then create a state review agency that would hear
local appeals for larger lot size requirements or for smaller ones, depending on
local circumstances.263 Applying the lessons of the Mt. Laurel story, I fear that
such a state agency might become a rubber stamp for local governments that are
determined to lot large. Alternatively, state law could establish a system by which
local governments and developers would bid against each other over the right to
build more densely; such a system would help reveal the depth of the demand for
dense housing, on the construction side, and the depth of the support for lotting
large, on the government’s side.264 State law could require suburbs to subsidize a
certain amount of low-cost housing in locations that were formerly lotted large;265
it could also award builders a density bonus for successful litigation against
localities that have unreasonably delayed their legal obligations.266 Or a state could
calculate the number of housing units that it might expect to need in the near future
261. See Emily Washington, How Affordable Housing Policies Backfire, MARKET URBANISM (May
29, 2014) http://marketurbanism.com/2014/05/29/how-affordable-housing-policies-backfire (discussing
the politics of inclusionary zoning and its potential to “backfire” in certain instances).
262. See Benjamin Powell & Edward Stringham, “The Economics of Inclusionary Zoning
Reclaimed": How Effective Are Price Controls?, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 471 (2005) (developing
economic arguments that inclusionary zoning drives up the cost of housing); Robert C. Ellickson, The
Irony of “Inclusionary” Zoning, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1167, 1170 (1981) (asserting that set-asides act as
“taxes” on housing construction and drive up the costs of housing for “moderate-income” and other
people).
263. Schoenbrod, supra note 38, at 1438-41. Some of the criteria for deviation from the
presumptive ceiling, such as proof of the effect on existing home prices, would seem to be extremely
speculative and subject to a potential for great mischief. Indeed, the presumption of a one-acre lot law
would allow zoning that is far less dense than typical in many suburban subdivisions.
264. See Benjamin Harney, The Economics of Exclusionary Zoning and Affordable Housing, 38
STETSON L. REV. 459 (2009) (discussing the working of a proposed auction for dense, affordable
housing).
265. See Mt. Laurel II, 456 A.2d 390, 443-45 (1983).
266. Id. at 452-53.
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and assign to regional authorities (composed of an entire metropolitan area) a legal
obligation to override local zoning and provide for a variety of costs and local
needs.
Using the simple economic model of the preference of localities for lotting
large, here is the skeleton of a new idea. Unlike other ideas, this concept would not
directly restrain large lot zoning, but would ameliorate some of its most harmful
effects, including its incentive to sprawl and its constraints on low-cost housing.
State law could assign each locality an obligation to allow for a certain number of
additional housing units—along the lines of the “fair share” calculation—beyond
the number of housing units that would be permissible under the locality’s
restrictive zoning. The locality would have to meet its obligation by rezoning—
perhaps in an area close to the central city or close to existing infrastructure. If
there were unmet demand for housing in the area, developers might be willing to
pay a small “impact fee” for the right to build housing units in greater numbers
than usual for an in-demand suburban area.267 Part or all of the funds raised by this
fee could be paid to existing owners in other areas of the jurisdiction, where new
housing could be limited even more stringently. These other areas could be chosen
by the local government because of an especially strong reason to avoid new
construction. These reasons could include special ecological or environmental
concerns, the unusual expense of building infrastructure, or the existence of a
cherished agricultural landscape.
For example, state law could require an affluent suburban county to provide
for 2,000 new housing units. This requirement might conflict with existing zoning,
including lotting large, that previously has made new construction difficult. The
county could meet the state law requirement by rezoning a close-in neighborhood
for 2,000 new townhouses. A developer of these townhouses might be willing to
pay an impact fee for a permit to build them. At the same time, the county could
ameliorate the potentially alarming increase in its density by downzoning a more
distant area of farms and forests. If the distant area had been zoned with large lot
restrictions, the law could be amended to prohibit any new housing from being
built in the area for a number of years. The county government could use the funds
from the townhouse impact fee to pay the owners of the farms and forests for the
tighter restrictions. This technique would be a variant of the popular land use
regulatory method of granting a regulated landowner a transferable development
right.268 Moreover, because the regulated farm and forest landowners have
267. Many local governments impose “impacts fees” on new housing development, in order to
recoup some of the infrastructure costs, such as for roads and schools, that the new development forces
the government to spend. For a discussion of the history and practice of impact fees, see Paul
Boudreaux, The Impact Xat: A New Approach to Charging for Growth, 43 U. MEM. L. REV. 35 (2012)
(arguing that impact fees too often serve in effect as taxes on new population, not as a means of steering
growth); see also Vicki Been, Impact Fees and Housing Affordability, 8 CITYSCAPE: J. POL’Y DEV. AND
RES. 139, 143-148 (2005), http://www.huduser.gov/periodicals/cityscpe/vol8num1/ch4.pdf (surveying
the literature and discussing the effect of impact fees on housing affordability).
268. A transferable development right may be awarded to a regulated landowner; the right to a
certain amount of construction may be sold to landowners in other areas in which the government
wishes new construction to be channeled. See, e.g., Dwight H. Merriam, Reengineering Regulation to
Avoid Takings, 33 URB. LAW. 1 (2001) (analyzing the technique to avoid a takings claim); John J.
Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE L. J. 75 (1973) (discussing the

42

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:1

generated some money from their properties, the government might be able to
withstand Lucas “total takings” claims from the owners of the more tightly
regulated lands.269
Through such a system, the local government’s objection to dense housing
might be assuaged. The new housing units required by state law would meet some
of the housing demand in the metropolitan region. But they would be compensated
for, in part, by a decrease in the prospect of new housing, in the immediate future,
in the suburban outskirts.270 Thus, the opposition to new housing from existing
county residents might be somewhat softened. At the same time, demand for new
housing would be shifted from the distant areas toward more compact, close-in
development. This is the definition of controlling suburban sprawl. Such an
approach would not be politically easy, but the idea might point the way toward
overcoming the great affinity that local governments hold for minimum lot size
laws.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article has endeavored to show that the practice of large lot zoning is both
ubiquitous and iniquitous. It is ironic that a nation supposedly committed both to
property rights and to housing affordability exploits a legal practice that runs afoul
of both principles. Large lot zoning restrains landowners who wish to build, drives
up the costs of housing by restricting supply, and pushes demand to suburban
outskirts. These phenomena result in the additional irony that American
metropolitan areas are the most sprawling in the world, but ones in which housing
costs are stubbornly expensive. Both property rights and affordability take back
seats in our system of local control of land use law. Dominating all else is that
local governments cater to the desires of existing homeowners to restrain new
construction, which enhances the values of the existing houses and avoids the
annoyances of greater density to the existing homeowners. In few other areas of
American law is the free market so strangled as it is in the market for suburban
housing.
Absent a legal revolution that frees housing construction from the domination
then-new idea); see also Penn Central Trans. Co., 438 U.S. at 137 (referring to the grant to the regulated
landowner of transferable development rights, which “mitigate[d]” the “financial burdens” on the
landowner, according to the court).
269. There is an argument that a payment to a landowner is insufficient to avoid a Lucas “total
takings” claim. Absent the payment, a total regulation would necessitate “just compensation.” If the
payment were viewed as a form “compensation,” as opposed to the earning of income from the land, it
is unlikely to be sufficient to meet the “just compensation” obligation of providing the fair market value
of the regulated land. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 747-48 (1997)
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment and concurring in part with the majority opinion) (citation
omitted).
270. In a sense, the system for encouraging new housing closer in and discouraging it in more distant
areas, while not increasing the overall density of the suburb too significantly, resembles the idea of the
“bubble” in the federal Clean Air Act, which allows a polluting source to increase, without added
regulations, the pollution in one section of a factory if it reduces the pollution in an older, dirtier section
of the factory by more. This system, set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(4) (2006) (the definition of
“modification”), was approved by the U.S. Supreme Court in the famous case that set forth the principle
of deference to agency's interpretation of a statute, Chevron, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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of local parochialism, there is no easy solution to the social and economic
distortions caused by lotting large. This is especially distressing, considering that
each year the United States generates a million new households, each of which
needs a house, apartment, or mobile home. This article has highlighted the
economic incentives for large lot zoning, and the formidable roadblock that the
Lucas takings principle plays in further encouraging governments to lot large. The
article suggests a framework for a legal system that would move the nation away
from the adverse effects of large lot zoning, while at the same time discouraging
sprawl, avoiding constitutional claims, and providing new housing for a growing
nation in the locations where it is most needed.

